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This thesis is a study of G. C.  Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital, a civil rights case that originated in Greensboro,  North Carolina. 
Although the courts had prohibited racial discrimination in a variety of 
institutions since the 195U desegregation decisions, discrimination against 
Negro doctors and patients was widespread until 196k when Simkins was 
decided.    Medical facilities employed a number of discriminatory methods, 
and a national law,  the Hill-Burton Act,  provided for federal grants to 
"separate but equal" hospitals.    In Simkins,  the court found these hospitals 
sufficiently involved with government to render them subject to the Four- 
teenth Amendment's prohibitions against racial discrimination and held 
unconstitutional the  section of the Hill-Burton Act which permitted this 
dis criraination. 
The case itself served as a precedent for similar litigation,  but 
its significance did not stop there.    As a result of the decision, Congress 
finally amended the Hill-Burton Act to end the financing of "separata but 
equal" medical facilities,  something it had refused to do only a year 
earlier.    Simkins was decided while the Senate was considering the 1°6U 
Civil Rights Bill,  and although the case may not have been the only factor 
insuring passage of Title VI of that bill,  it certainly ended the possibility 
that exceptions would be written into the law.    Virtually all programs 
receiving federal assistance after January 1965 were required to be free 
of racial discrimination in compliance with Title VT of the 1961* Civil Rights 
Act.    Simkins took the first stept    Congress followed. 
V 
The Simkins decision also -wrote a new concept of state action 
into constitutional law. Since 1883 the courts have been bound by the 
principle that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to private actions 
but to those of the state. Gradually the judiciary has included the 
actions of many private institutions in the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but, with the new test developed in Simkins, practically any 
private institution may be within the reach of the Constitution. In 
Simkins the court took another step away from the 1883 Civil Rights Cases 
without overruling the precedent established in that decision. Perhaps 
that decision has been overruled—for if the line between state and 
private action has not been erased, it has been shifted to include many 
formerly private institutions within the definition of state action. 
On the basis of its impact on racial discrimination and its 
effect on constitutional law, G. C. Simkin3 v. Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital is clearly a landmark decision. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution of the United States is a living thing, 
continually growing.    A large part of its growth in the past decade 
has been a result of the "Negro revolution."    The era of desegregation 
officially began in 195U when the Supreme Court held racial segregation 
in public schools to be uncomstitutional,1 and by 1963 the courts 
had struck down racial discrimination in a variety of institutions. 
One area that desegregation had not reached, however, was medicine, 
especially the hospital.    It was with this institution that 0. C. Simkins 
et al. v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital et al. was concerned. 
The SimkLna case is of interest because it dramatizes the 
problems of racial discrimination in hospitals,  but is its study 
justified otherwise?    Some felt the case was as significant as the 
195U school desegregation decisions, but was the decision one that can 
be designated "landmark?"    Did it have a marked effect on discrimination 
in hospitals?    Were its effects on constitutional law of consequence? 
These are the questions with which this paper is concerned* 
1Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 3U7 U. S. U83 (195U) and 
Boiling TTsTTarpe,  JU7 U~. S. k91 (195U).     
o 
G. C. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 211 F. Supp. 
628 (M. B. N. C. 1962), 323 P. 2d 959 (Uth Cir. 1963), cert, denied, 
376 U. S. 938 (196J*). 
2 
CHAPTER I 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN UNITED STATES HOSPITALS! 
A NATIONAL PROBLEM 
The victim of an automobile accident was driven to the nearest 
Mississippi hospital,  one arm nearly ripped from her body.    Upon 
arrival she iras greeted with "We don't takB Negroes," and sent to 
another hospital*   Enroute, Bessie Smith, the great jazz singer, 
bled to death.      This incident occurred in 1937, but it could have 
happened as recently as five years ago.    Although the most likely 
location for such happening was the South, the North could not claim 
to be free of discrimination.    Since the Civil War, discrimination in 
medicine has existed and it has respected no boundaries* 
The quality of medical treatment afforded the Negro viiile under 
slavery is  subject to various interpretations.    Fanny Kerable wrote of 
her shock at seeing sick slaves lying on the floor without mattress or 
pillow on filthy,   ragged blankets  in the infirmary of her husband's 
o 
plantation.      This was probably the exception rather than the rule on 
plantations, however.    Generally speaking,  slaves represented a tremendous 
^Edward Albee dramatized this story of hospital discrimination in 
a play entitled "The Death of Bessie Smith" which was produced on Broadway 
in 1961.    The Zoo Story; The Death of Bessie Smith; The Sandbox*    Three 
Plays Introduced by the Author (New York!    Coward-McCann,  I960).    For 
accounts of other Negro leaders who have  been victims of similar hospital 
discrimination,   see Langston Hughes, Fight For Freedom!    The Story of the 
NAACP (New Torki    W. W. Norton and Company,  Inc., 1962), pp. 161-163. 
2Francis B. Simkins, A History of the South (New York!    Alfred 
A. Knopf,  1963),  p. 127. 
investment,  an investment that was carefully protected.    For most 
slaveholders,  "... a sick Negro was a liability and a dead Negro was 
worth nothing."3    Under slavery,  the health of the Negro was as good 
as that of his white neighbors,  and in some areas the Negro mortality 
rate was even lower. 
It was after emancipation that the Negro's medical problems really 
began.    Suddenly left on his own and usually poor, he could not afford 
the medical care he required.    With time,  his economic position improved 
somewhat,  but a variety of obstacles appeared to prevent his obtaining 
needed medical attention.    By the 1930's patterns of discrimination 
were well crystallized.    Segregation and discrimination wore sanctioned 
and,  indeed, required,  by law in the South, and by custom in many 
northern hospitals. 
Patterns of Discrimination 
In l°Uh Gunnar Myrdal wrote, "Area for area, class for class, 
Negroes cannot get the same advantages in the way of prevention and 
cure of disease that the whites can."6    Xs recently as 1°63,  racial 
discrimination in medicine was cited as the principal reason that 
"...  Negro infant mortality is from two to five times greater than 
■'Ibid. 
^Max Seham, "Discrimination Against Negroes in Hospitals," New 
England Journal of ?fedicine, CCLXXI (October, 1°6U),  °U0. 
^Paul B. Cornely,  "Segregation and Discrimination in Ifedical Care 
in the  United States,"    American Journal of Public Health, XLVI  (September, 
1956),  107U.    Gunnar lyrrial also noted that "Even in the North there are 
many private hospitals which d» not accept Negro patients."    An American 
Dilemma:    The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York:    Harperand 
Brothers Publishers,  19UU),  p. 3UU. 
6f.tyrdal,  p. 171. 
white  infant mortality, why white women are five times less likely to 
die in childbirth than Negro women, and why Negro life expectancy is 
almost seven years less than white life expectancy."?    The products of 
discrimination—unequal educational opportunities, the shortage of Negro 
doctors, the inability of Negro doctors to obtain staff privileges in 
first-rate hospitals,  inadequate health facilities for Negroes,  the 
virtual exclusion of Negro doctors from the major professional organi- 
sation—have combined to produce a common resultt    poor health conditions 
for all Negroes. 
Although discrimination has existed in many sectors of medicine, 
it has perhaps been most injurious to the Negro in the area of hospital 
facilities. Because of the complexity of modern medicine, the hospital 
is the center of treatment and cure of disease. And, of course, access 
to hospital facilities  is vital for the doctor as well as the patient.8 
The White-Only Hospital 
One of the most conspicuous forms of hospital discrimination is 
exemplified by the all-white hospital.    The disadvantages afforded the 
Negro by complete segregation are quite obvious.    As was probably the 
case with Bessie Smith,  the time required to drive an emergency patient 
to another hospital might mean the difference between life and death. 
'Constance B. Motley, "Desegregation, What it Means to the Medical 
Profession and the Itesponaibilities it Places on the Negro Professional," 
National Medical Association Journal, LV  (September,  1963), Uu2. 
8»The most important single element in the continued education of 
physicians is affiliation with a hospital."    Dietrich C. Reitzes,   Negroes 
and Medicine   (Cambridgei    Harvard University Press, 1958), p.  27$, 
In some areas, hospital facilities might not be available to Negroes 
at all.9 
In view of the unite-only hospital which existed everywhere, 
Negroes began setting up their own separate  institutions.    Negro hospitals, 
however,  where they existed,  did not necessarily remedy the situation. 
The all-Negro hospital was usually inferior to its white counterpart 
because,  "Under the present plan of privately owned duplicating hospital 
setups,  new institutions are beyond the financial reach of Negroes and 
they must,  therefore,  accept  'cast-offs'   .   .  .i*10    Thus,  as a result of 
a completely segregated hospital system,  "None,  second,  third or fourth 
rate hospitals have largely been the portion of the Negro people.*^- 
The evils of this segregated system were noted as early as 1°U0 
by the Council of ifedical Education and Hospitals which reported that 
°This was  the situation in some counties in North Carolina in 19U0 
as is shown in the following table.    For statistics on every county in 
North Carolina see Clarence Poe,  ed., Hospital and Medical Care for all 
our People:    Report of the Chairman and S'ub-comnittees of^ the North 
Carolina Hospital and Medical Care  Comrission.  lQUlt-U5  (Raleighs    North 
Carolina Ifedical Care Commission, 19U7),  pp.  o2-bk. 
County White 
Population 
Hospital 
Beds for 
Vihites 
Negro 
Population 
Hospital 
Beds for 
Negroes 
Chatham 
Johnston 
Person 
Sampson 
Swain 
16, 8U* 
50,3h° 
15,827 
30,828 
11,797 
18 
35 
25 
6 
28 
7,912 
13,Wi9 
9,202 
16,612 
380 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10ffilliam M. Cobb,  "Ifedical Care and the Plight of the Negro,■ 
The Crisis, UV (July, 19U7), 208. 
Hlbid.,  201. 
added and better hospital facilities were needed by the Negroes Of the 
South and that "... the interests of the colored race would be best 
served by making provision for them in institutions designed to serve 
the entire population rather than by the establishment of separate 
hospitals caring for Negroes only."^   During the 191*0's there was a 
crescendo of voices calling attention to the injustices of segregation 
in medical facilities but "separate but equal" facilities continued to 
exist and were still being built  (with the aid of federal funds) as late 
as 1961. .^ 
Hospitals Admitting Negro Patients 
Hospitals that admitted Negro patients as well as whites might 
discriminate  in a variety of ways.    Separate lounges, water fountains, 
rest rooms,  entrances, exits and snack bars could be expected*    But 
more important, there were usually conditions for the admittance of 
Negroes that did not apply to white patients.    The hospital might have 
been a white-only institution that accepted Negroes only if they were 
emergency cases.    Should the Negro require hospitaliaation on any basis 
other than emergency, however, he would be refused admittance.   Another 
type of restriction has been the admittance of Negroes to a white hospital 
^"Hospitalization of Negro Patients *   A Report from t he Council 
on Medical Education and Hospitals," American Medical Association Journal, 
CX7 (October, 191.0), 11.61. 
^n Jiarch of 1961* when the Supreme Court of the United States 
denied certiorari in the Simkins case, there were eight "separate but 
equal" projects in varying stages of construction.    U. S. Commission on 
Civil Sights, Equal Opportunity in Hospitals and Health Facilities 
(Washingtoni    U. S. Government Printing Office,  1965), p. «• 
if there were some facility or service available in that hospital which 
was not in the Negro institution.    Empty hospital beds were not usually 
included in the definition of "facility or service."    Therefore, the 
inability of the Negro institution to hospitalize a patient because of 
overcrowded conditions was not a factor which would allow a Negro to be 
admitted to the white hospital* 
Many hospitals admitted Negro patients without putting either of 
these restrictions on them, but limited their number to only a few beds. 
When these beds were filled,  even if there were vacant beds in the white 
section, no Negro patient was admitted.     The quota system was considered 
a logical method of distributing hospital beds,  and in many instances 
facilities allocated to Negroes corresponded almost exactly to their 
proportion of the population.1^    At first glance,  this may seem fair 
enough, but sickness and accident do not necessarily follow population 
statistics.    Moreover,  the Negro's generally low economic state tended 
to increase his need for hospitalization. ' 
Perhaps the most widely publicized form of discrimination in 
hospitals has been the notorious "Jim Crow" ward—a separate ward, wing 
or building for Negroes, usually inadequate and inferior to the sections 
!^For example,  the report submitted annually by the North Carolina 
Medical Care Commission (the state's Hill-Burton agency) showed each 
year that the number of beds in each reporting area was proportionately 
equal to the division of population by race.   As long as the state plan 
showed proportional equality in the number of beds for each race,  the 
nondiscrimination requirement of the Hill-Burton Act was considered to 
have been met and hospitals could receive federal grants on a "separate 
but equal* basis.    James D. Snyder, "Race Bias in Hospitals*   What the 
Civil Rights Commission Found," Hospital Management,  XCVT  (November, 1963), 
5U. 
iSjames A. Dombrowski, "Practices and Attitudes in Southern Hospitals," 
Modern Hospital, LXXEX (August, 1952), 78, 
of the hospital that housed white patients.    In l$>5l, a Negro minister 
recorded his impression of the separate facilities provided for members 
of his races 
While pastoring in a southern city, I found one of the best 
members of my church on a rickety bed in the dingy basement 
of the city hospital. The place reminded me of a dungeon 
more than of a hospital. The stench that emitted from it 
iras terrific. I felt chagrined, distressed, shocked beyond 
description. I did not think that any such condition could 
be found in Christian America. 16 
The basement ward had long been considered a "southern institution,1 
but was it?    Shaken by his experience, this minister decided to make a 
nationwide study of the hospitalization of his people.    After visiting 
170 cities in the forty-eight states he wrote:    "I found conditions 
throughout the country just as deplorable and shocking as I had found 
them in the southern city.    I found at the time that in a vast section of 
our country the Negro  sick were being cared for principally in basements 
or in little annexes to the hospitals proper, which were entered from the 
rear."17 
From the available evidence one could not draw the conclusion that 
all,  or even most,  Negro patients were  shut away in dark, filthy, inferior 
sections of hospitals where they were practically left to die.    The 
extent  to which such conditions existed is unknown.    Such conditions, 
however, did exist* 
l^Amos H. Carnegie,  "  ... But Integration is Empty Talk," Modern 
Hospital,  UXIX (June,  1951), 55. 
l?Ibld., 56. 
The Negro Doctor'a Plight 
Because  it is virtually impossible to practice medicine without 
being a member of a hospital staff,  many of the Negro doctor's complaints 
have centered around hospital policies.    He could not hope to obtain 
staff privileges in a unite-only institution.   If there were a separate 
hospital for Negroes, he and his patients of course had access to its 
facilities, but what if there were no Negro hospital, or if his patient 
needed a service that could only be furnished by a predominantly white 
hospital that admitted Negro patients?    In most casea,  the Negro physician 
had to turn his patient over to a staff member of the white hospital—■ 
white physician.   The hospital, though it would admit the Negro patient, 
did not give Negro physicians positions on its staff.    In the 191*0'» 
there were only a few hospitals in the United States where Negro and 
white doctors worked together equally,1°    The situation was not much 
altered by 1963 when Dr. John A. Kenney, outgoing president of the 
all-Negro National Medical Association, cited "the difficulty in becoming 
a full-fledged staff member of a hospital" as the Negro doctor's 
19 "current central grievance.*^ 
Sevei'al obstacles have kept Negro doctors from obtaining staff 
positions in predominantly white hospitals,  the most common being the 
requirement that the applicant be a member of the local affiliate of 
the American Medical Association.    Until recently,  this was an almost 
l^lfyrdal, P» 323. 
l9New York Tines, August 13, 1963, p. 22. 
10 
20 impassable barrier.        "The record of treatment of the Negro by the 
American Medical Association and its component societies over the past 
century is one of Jin Crowism in every aspect of the practice of 
medicine."21    In 189$ Negro doctors organised their own society, the 
National Medical Association because "The American Ifedical Association 
slammed the door and shut us out,   .   .  ."22    Although the National 
Ifedical Association has met many of the Negro doctor's needs, membership 
did not help him get a hospital staff appointment. 
If he were a member of the local medical society,  the Negro doctor 
faced still another problem.    He was required (just as were white applicants) 
to obtain the personal endorsement in writing of two members of the 
existing hospital staff—two white physicians.    White doctors were 
reluctant to endorse Negro applicants for several reasons.    Sometimes 
they felt that the Negro's training was not adequate.    As Ifyrdal wrote 
in 19Uk, "The fact that the Negro doctor has such small opportunities 
for hospital training and specialised work is the reason why there  Is 
some justification for the belief that the Negro is less well trained 
than the white man as a physician or surgeon.«23   Befo" *■ widespread 
20Merabership in the AMA is controlled entirely by each local branch. 
This policy has allowed widespread discrimination against Negroes, 
especially in the southern units which almost  invariably set up white- 
only policies.    By 1963 the barriers had begun to come down.    About one- 
half of the members of the NMA also belonged to the AMA.   Although many 
local units still practiced discrimination, only in one state, Iouisiana, 
did the AMA branches have a statewide policy of admitting whites only. 
New York Times, August 13,  1963,  P«  22. 
2htox Seham,  "Discrimination Against the Negro in Medicine,"  National 
Medical Association Journal, LVT (March, 196U), 155. 
22Ibid. 
23Myrdal, p. 32U. 
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integration of medical schools in the 1950's2** and the subsequent 
acceptance of Negroes for internships in many hospitals, this was very 
definitely a factor. "    Secondly, the white physician usually did not 
know the Negro applicant very well—their paths rarely crossed—and he 
was understandably hesitant to sponsor the application of a physician 
about whom he knew little.    Then, too, race bias was a factor not to 
be discounted* 
Thus,  for the most part,  the Negro doctor had to practice medicine 
in hospitals for his race only,  or in no hospital at all* 
"*»The number of Negroes in predominantly white medical schools 
has increased considerably since 19U7, when there were only 93 Negroes 
in 20 predominantly white medical schools.    In 1955-1956 there were 216 
Negro students in U8 of these schools. ...      By 1958 the qualified 
Negro applicant had opportunities for acceptance in a first-rate medical 
school equal to those of qualified white applicants.    There is evidence 
also that those medical schools having Negro students would have accepted 
more, had more qualified Negroes applied.    Indeed,  a number of medical 
schools have actively sought Negro candidates who can meet their entrance 
standards."    National Medical Fellowships,  New Opportunities for Negroes 
in Medicine  (Chicagot    National Medical Fellowships,  1965),  p. 10. 
25ln the introduction to Negroes and Medicine it was noted that 
things had certainly changed since 1931 when Negroes faced the risk of 
having to go without an internship*    «...  not only are there adequate 
internships and residencies available to Negroes, but also most of these 
positions are in predominantly white institutions."    In 19U7, of the 
119 graduates of Howard and ?feharry, U9 served internships in B pre- 
dominantly white hospitals.    In 1956, of 129 graduates of Howard and 
Meharry, 77 served internships in U6 predominantly white hospitals. 
This means that 60 per cent of the graduates of the two  Negro medical 
schools in 1956 served their internships in non-Negro hospitals.    The 
Sgro graduates of predominantly wbite medical schools ^J^erneMp. 
SI residency training in predominantly white hospitals to an even 
greater degree than Howard and Msharry graduates.    Reitzes,  p. *xv. 
The Evidence?    Surveys Concerning Discrimination In Hospitals 
Can the generalizations concerning discrimination be supported by 
dates,  places  and figures?    At any given point in history,  how many hospitals 
in the United States admitted only white patients, how many admitted white 
and Negro on an equal basis,  how many discriminated against Negro patients 
and physicians in the various ways described in the preceding pages?    The 
statistics necessary to present a complete picture simply do not exist. 
Racial policies with respect to doctors and patients varies from hospital 
to hospital and for this reason most data on the subject must be derived 
from surveys which measure only a sample.    Some  conclusions,  however, 
can be drawn from these  sources• 
Southern Conference Educational Fund Survey 
In 1952 the  results of a survey that had recently been conducted 
by the Southern Conference Educational Fund concerning the  Negro's hospital 
treatment were made known.2      Administrators of the 2Ulh hospitals listed 
by the American Hospital Association Directory for eighteen southern 
and border states and  the District of Columbia were questioned about 
their racial policies.    From 29.9 per cent  (711 hospitals)  came  usable 
replies.    Of the  711 hospitals,  581t  (82 per cent) admitted Negro patients. 
Only 108 of these  (exclusive  of federal and all-Negro institutions) 
allotted hospital beds according to need,  not race.    Of the 108 hospitals, 
68 practiced neither segregation nor the quota system} 1*0 practiced 
segregation but allotted  beds  according to need.    Because U06 hospitals 
2^The results were published in an article by James A. Dombrowski 
(then,  the director of the Southern Conference Educational Fund),  "Practices 
and Altitudes  in Southern Hospitals," Modem Hospital,  LXHX (August, 
1952),  78-79. 
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admitted Negroes on a strict quota system and 127 hospitals were unite- 
only in the 676 institutions   (35 federal and special hospitals excluded), 
only 33,U5l (32.U per cent) of the 102,96? beds were available to Negroes. 
The 32 .U per cent of hospital beds allotted to  Negroes closely 
followed their percentage of the region's population, but the evils of 
the quota system have  already been discussed.    Further,  the survey 
showed that in several states  (Louisiana and South Carolina particularly) 
Negro hospital space was concentrated in one or two large institutions. 
This was naturally a great handicap for blacks living in areas any 
significant distance from these hospitals. 
A Study of Fourteen Selected Communities 
In 1956 Dietrich C.  Jteitges conducted a survey on which he based 
his book,  Negroes and MBdicine.    Fourteen communities,  containing over 
one-fifth of all nonwhites and more than a third of all Negro physicians 
in the  United States, were  studied.     Table  1 (page lu)  illustrates what 
he found. 
The  statistics on the communities speak for themselves.    In only 
two of these,  Gary and New York,  had a substantial portion of the  Negro 
physicians abtained staff positions in predominantly white hospitals. 
With the exception of Gary,  the highest percentage of these hospitals 
that accepted Negro physicians was 51.7 per cent  in New York.    In three 
of the  southern communities no Negro doctors had staff privileges  in any 
of the  predominantly white institutions. 
The whole picture presented by these figures is even more  indicative 
of the problem Negro  physicians faced in obtaining staff positions.    Of 
TABLE 1 
INTEGRATION OF STAFFS OF PREDOMINANTLY WHITE HOSPITALS IN FOURTEEN COMMUNITIES!    1956a 
Negro Predominantly 
Physicians White 
Affiliated Hospitals 
with with 
Predominantly Predominantly Negro 
Negro White White Physicians 
Community Physicians Hospitals Hospitals on staff 
Gary, Indiana 17 1U 2 2 
New York, New York 51 36 29 15 
Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania 1U2 UO 51 19 
Los Angeles,  California 121 30 18 7 
Indianapolis, Indiana 26 6 6 3 
Boston, Massachusetts 19 U 28 k 
Detroit, Michigan 160 25 30 12 
St. Louis, Missouri 85 9 27 6 
Chicago,  Illinois 226 16 65 8 
Kansas City, Missouri 37 2 9 2 
Washington, D.  C. 22U 8 20 6 
Atlanta, Georgia 36 0 10 0 
New Orleans, Louisiana U8 0 13 0 
Nashville, Tennessee 30 0 6 0 
•Statistics in this table were taken from Reitzes,  Negroes and Medicine,  p. 331, Table 68. "Rank 
order of integration of fourteen selected communities by percentage of predominantly white hospitals with 
Negro physicians on their staffs, 1956" and Table 67. "Rank order of integration of fourteen selected 
communities by percentage of Negro physicians with appointments in predominantly white hospitals, 1965." 
a total of 1222 Negro doctors, only 190 (15.5 per cent) enjoyed staff 
privileges in predominantly white hospitals.    Only 8U of 30k predominantly 
white institutions   (27.6 per cent) employed Negro physicians.    Although 
these  statistics do not apply to the United States as a whole, because 
of the high percentage of Negroes and Negro doctors in these communities, 
they may be considered a significant indication of hospital racial policies 
in the United States in 1956. 
The United States Civil Rights Commission Report 
Because of persistent complaints of discrimination against Negroes 
by hospitals,  the Civil Rights Commission launched an investigation of 
this problem in I960.2'    The survey covered hospitals in counties having 
a concentration of Negroes  (at least 5,000 in a total population of 250,000), 
Three hundred and ninety-eight hospitals in 3U states  (U5 in the border 
states,  130 in southern states,  and 21U in northern and western states) 
were sent questionnaires.    Of these,  219 hospitals replied. 
A policy of admission without regard to race was claimed by 175 
hospitals,  but many that reported no racial barriers also said that 
separate facilities were provided for Negroes.    Eleven hospitals answered 
that they served one racial group only (one for Indians, five for Negroes 
and five for whites), but 29 hospitals failed to answer this question. 
In the South,  8iw5 per cent of the 22 reporting admitted to practices of 
racial segregation or exclusion.    Only two of the 133 hospitals studied 
in the northern and western states reported any type of segregation. 
27A summary of the report may be found in an article by James D. 
Snyder,  "Race Bias in Hospitals I    What the Civil Rights Commission Found," 
Hospital Management, XCVT  (November, 1963),  52-5U. 
16 
Although the Civil Rights Commission Report indicates almost no 
discrimination against Negro patients in the North and West,  the study 
Reitzes conducted only four years earlier indicates that widespread dis- 
crimination against Negro doctors existed in these geographic areas as 
well as others.-0    Thus,  racial prejudice in medicine was a factor in all 
areas of the United States.    Adnittedly one that weighed most heavily in 
southern and border states,  racial discrimination in medicine was a 
national problem. 
The Hill-Burton Act 
The fact  that racial discrimination could be found throughout the 
entire United States i3 not the only reason that  it might be considered 
a national problem.    Dr. John Kenney noted in 1963 that  "Racial discrimi- 
nation among the nation's hospitals is particularly out of order since 
some 6,000 hospitals have benefited from the $2,000,000,000 in federal 
construction funds under the 19U6 Hill-Burton Act."2°    The degree of 
2oThe problem of staff appointments still plagues Negro doctors in 
the North.    In 1966,  John L. S. Holloman,  then President of the NMA, 
pointed out that 95 per cent of the Negro physicians practicing in New 
York City did not hold staff appointments at any of the major medical 
facilities.    He continued,  "The northern style of defacto 2sifi7 segregation 
which exist /sic,/ on the hospital staffs of our major metropolitan areas 
is a fact of life which must be dealt with.    This type of racial discrimi- 
nation in the health facilities of the North is just as deadly as it is in 
the South,  but it is far most sophisticated and carefully camouflaged,  under 
disguises which often times defy detection.    I know it is therei    You know 
it is therei    In the past, too often,  any attempts to prove that it is 
there have been met with utter and absolute frustration."    JohnL. S. 
Holloman,  "A New Horizon," Inaugural Address made before the meeting of 
the National Medical Association, Washington, D. C, August 9,  1966 
(mimeographed),  pp. 9-10. 
29New York Times, August 13,  1963,  p.  22. 
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government involvement with hospitals is made even more apparent by the 
fact that there were only 7,138 hospitals in the country in 1963.30   On 
the basis of these figures, approximately 85 per cent of the hospital* 
in the United States had received federal aid under the Hill-Burton Act. 
Years of depression and World War II resulted in a need for govern- 
ment aid to hospitals.   Although the first three decades of the twentieth 
century were ones of rapid growth in the number of hospitals, after 1929, 
not only did the construction cease, but betv,een 1928 and 1938 nearly 800 
hospitals went out of business,31    This decrease,  combined with the increase 
in population, drastically reduced the ratio of hospitals to people.    As 
a result,  the Commission on Hospital Care was organized in October,  19Uh, 
to study the nation's hospital needs.    The commission endorsed the  principle 
of federal and state cooperation to assist in hospital construction as a 
remedy,  and,  acting on this suggestion, Congress passed the Hospital Survey 
and Construction Act in 191*6. 
This law,   com: only known as the Hill-Burton Act,  because it was 
sponsored by Senators Lister Hill and Harold Burton,  authorized federal 
grants to states for surveying hospital needs, developing state plans for 
construction of facilities and f or assisting in the construction and 
equipment of public and voluntary nonprofit private health facilities." 
3C"Thi8 figure refers to hospitals registered with the American Hospital 
Association, taken from a statistical profile of U. S. hospitals in Hospitals, 
Journal of the American Hospital Association, XXXIX (August,  1965),  1*31* 
^hj, S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,  Two Decades of 
Partnership (Washington!    U. S. Government Printing Office,  1966),  p. 9. 
32The law has been amended several times to broaden the program to 
include such things as grants for construction of nursing homes,  rehabil- 
itation    and chronic disease facilities, as well as grants for hospital 
research.    See U.  S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,  Hill-Burton 
Program Progress "-eporti    July 1,  19U7-June 30, 1965 (Washington:    U.  S» 
Government Printing Office,  19&!»). 
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The aid was to be made available through annual Congressional appro- 
priations.    Appropriations were then  to be allotted to the states 
according to a formula based on population and per capita income. 
The  grants ranged from one-third to two-thirds of the total cost of 
construction and equipment. 
The Surgeon General of the United States was made administrator 
of the Hill-Burton program.    He was  given the  responsibility of issuing 
regulations  (subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Department of 
Health,  Education and Welfare,  and of the  Federal Hospital Council) estab- 
lishing standards for state plans.    On the  state level,  the  program was 
to be administered by an agency established for that purpose, with the 
responsibility for surveying all existing health facilities  in that state 
to determine what was needed.    On the basis of these surveys, state plans 
were to be prepared and submitted for the approval of the  Surgeon General. 
If the state plan were approved by the latter,  periodic federal payments 
were  to be made to the state agency for disbursement to the hospitals. 
The passage of the Hill-Burton Act was generally heralded  as a 
step forward in the struggle to maintain adequate health care for the 
American people.    It was not,  however,  without its critics.    As early as 
19U8,  it was noted that the  Negro might not  share equally in this program! 
"Indications have appeared that in the  South and,  indirectly,  in parts of 
the  North,  various subterfuges will be used to avoid compliance with the non- 
discrimination clause of the Hill-Burton Hospital Survey and Construction 
Act."33    Subterfuge,  however,   was hardly necessary.    The nondiscrimination 
33wiHiaai M. Cobb,  "Progress and Portents  for the Negro in Medicine," 
The Crisis,  LV (April, 191*8),  107. 
1? 
clause itself provided that the Surgeon General should prescribe by 
regulations 
(f )  lhat the  State  plan shall provide  for adequate hospital 
facilities for the people residing in a State, without 
discrimination on account of race, creed, or color,  .  .  . 
Such regulation may require that before approval of any 
application for a hospital or addition to a hospital is 
recommended by a State agency, assurance shall be received 
by the State from the applicant that (1) such hospital or 
addition to a hospital will be made available to all 
persons residing in the territorial area of the applicant, 
without discrimination on account of race, creed, or color, 
but an exception shall be made in cases where separate 
hospital facilities are provided for separate population 
groups,  if the plan makes equitable provision on the 
basis of need for facilities and services of like quality 
for each such group;   .   .  . 3k (emphasis mine) 
On November lh, 19U6, the regulation provided for was approved by the 
Federal Hospital Councili 
53»62 Nondiscrimination,    Before a construction application 
is recommended by a  State agency for approval,  the State 
agency shall obtain assurance from the applicant that the 
facilities to be built with aid under the Act will be made 
available without discrimination on account of race, creed, 
or color, to all persons residing in the area to be served 
by that facility.    However,  in any area where separate  .   .  . 
facilities are provided for separate population groups, 
the State agency may waive the requirement of assurance 
from the construction applicant if (a) it finds that the 
p±an otherwise maices equitaoie provision on the basis of 
need for facilities and services of like quality for each 
such population group in the area, aid (b) such finding is 
subsequently approved by the Surgeon General.    Facilities 
provided under the Federal Act will be considered 8J Bailing 
equitable provision for separate population groups when the 
facilities to be bua.Lt for tae group less well provided for 
heretofore are equal to the proportion of such group in the 
total population of the area, except that the State plan 
shall not program facilities for a separate population group ,- 
for construction beyond the level of adequacy for such group, 
(emphasis mine) 
3lfffospital Survey and Construction Act,  in U. S.,  Statutes at Large, 
IX, 10U3. 
35u. s., Federal Register,  XII, 6875. 
1 
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In terms of racial policy,  then there were two types of facilities 
that  could be  constructed with Hill-Burton funds»    "separate but equal," 
and nondiscriminatory. 
A grant  could be approved for an all-white or all-Negro hospital 
if the locality were one  that had separate institutions for separate 
population groups.    The  Surgeon General,  in his regulation,  interpreted 
"equitable provision" to mean that the facilities built for each group 
must be equal to the proportion of that  group in the population of the 
area.    Sponsors of all hospital projects were required to submit a form 
which read* 
No person / certain persons  (cross out one)  in the area will 
be denied admission to the proposed facilities as patients 
because of race,  creed,  or color.36 
If the words "no person" were  crossed out,  the state agency had to indicate 
on a separate form thati 
The requirement of nondiscrimination has  been met because 
this is  an area where separate facilities are provided for 
separate population groups and the  state plan otherwise 
makes equitable provision,  on the basis of need,  for 
facilities and services of like quality for each such 
population group in the area.37 
Thus,  the federal government adopted the quota system as a basis for per- 
mitting the establishment of "separate but equal" facilities. 
3"Jack Greenberg et al.,  "In the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, G. C.  Simkins,  Jr., et  al. and United States of America, 
Appellants v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, a Corporation et al., Appel- 
lees,  On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of North Carolina, Appellants' Appendix,"  (1963),  p.93a»    Cited hereafter 
as "Appellants' Appendix." 
37ibid., p. 101a. 
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Although in 1°$U the Supreme Court pronounced the first in a series 
of decisions declaring "separata but equal" public facilities unconsti- 
tutional, the racial policies governing the administration of the Hill- 
Burton program did not change.   Between 191*6 and 1963 approximately 
seventy separate health facilities (less thaa 1 per cent of all Hill- 
Burton projects) were constructed for either unite or Negro patients.^^ 
Of the eighty-nine grants going to these seventy "separate but equal" 
institutions, only thirteen were for Negro facilities.    Ihe federal 
contribution totaled $36,775,99U»   $ii,080,308 of it went to projects 
for Negro use.3° 
Nearly 7,000 Hill-Burton projects constructed between 19h6 and 
1963 were of the "nondiscriminatory" variety.**0    Sponsors of "nondiscrim- 
inatory" institutions were required to assure that the facilities would 
be available to all persons without discri ination on account of race, 
creed,  or color.    But the nondiscriminatory requirement was interpreted 
by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to mean that no person 
could be denied admission as a patient because of race,  creed, or color 
to that portion of the facility constructed with federal funds.    He could, 
however,  be denied admission to other portions of the facility.141    Patients 
38U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Equal Opportunity in Hospitals 
and Health Facilities, p. 5« 
39James D. Snyder, Hospital Management, XCVT,  SU. 
k°U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Equal Opportunity in Hospitals 
and Health Facilities, p. 5. 
Jillbid. 
could be segregated within the facility, professionally qualified persons 
could be denied staff privileges,  and interns could be denied training 
on account of race, creed, or color. 
Racial discrimination in hospitals was a problem of national 
proportion.    Could federal law permit racial discrimination by institutions 
which received government grants?   Could private hospitals by virtue of 
their participation in the Hill-Burton program oe held subject to the 
constitutional prohibitions against racial discrimination?    Several 
Greensboro, North Carolina, physicians and dentists decided to find out. 
telbid., p. 6. 
23 
CHAPTER II 
LITIGATION BEGINS 
The North Carolina Setting 
It was fitting that the suit which challenged the constitution- 
ality of the "separate but equal* clause of the Hill-Burton Act should 
arise in North Carolina.    The federal government had helped build more 
separate medical facilities there than in any other state.    By 1963 
there had been 31 such projects constructed in North Carolina with 
Hill-Burton funds,  27 for whites and k for Negroes. 
Despite  continued construction of separate facilities,  according 
to statistics on hospitals receiving assistance from the Duke Endowment, 
the pattern appears to have been breaking down between 19U5 and I960. 
Of the 89 general hospitals listed in 19U5, there were 20 white-only, 
58 open to both races,  and 11 Negro-only.2    By I960,  however,  of 122 
hospitals,  lh were white-only,  97 Negro and white, and 11 Negro-only.3 
white-only institutions were decreasing in number as institutions open 
to Negroes and whites were increasing.    It does not therefore follow, 
ISnyder, Hospital ifenagenent,  XCVT,  5U» 
2Duke Endowment. The Duke Endowment Year Book (Charlottei    Duke 
Endowment, 19U6), pp. 17-20. 
3ouke Endowment, Annual Report of the Hospital aid Orphan Sections, 
I960 (Charlottei    Duke Endowment, 1961),  pp. 26-29. 
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however, that there was less discrimination. 
Discrimination may be defined in many ways.    North Carolina 
hospitals operated on a quota system in the allotment of beds.    If 
discrimination within this quota system is examined,  the state had 
certainly changed since 1928 when 8U per cent of the hospital beds were 
alloted to whites (then 70 per cent of the state's population) and 
16 per cent were set aside for the 30 per cent of the population that 
was Negro.*   On the basis of data available for a majority of the 
hospitals in North Carolina, since 19U0 the percentage of hospital 
beds alloted to members of the Negro race has been roughly equal to 
their proportion of the state's population, about 25 per cent.5    (See 
Table 2,  p. 25 and Table 3> p. 26.)    Even the equality within the 
system, however,  is open to question.    Did proportional equality exist 
in fact as well as on paper?     Certainly the actual equality of the 
facilities themselves might be challenged.? 
Ujulius Rosenwald Fund,  Negro Hospitals!    A Compilation of 
Available Statistics (Chicago:    Julius P-osenwald Fund, 1931), p. 2lw 
$Alt iough a survey of 122 N. C. hospitals in I960 found that 
there nere 10,797 beds classified as white (79.6 per cent) and 2,771 as 
Negro (20.U por cent)  ("Integration Battlefront,"  National Medical 
Association Journal, LV /January, 1963/, 57.), the percentages in Table 2, 
p. 25, are probably more indicative of the general pattern of bed 
allotment because a larger portion of the total hospitals was studied 
and because the state plans submitted by the North Carolina Medical Care 
Co«mis3ion showed proportional equality in hospital beds for both races. 
6Jame3 Snyder suggests that one failing of the Public Health Service 
was that it only asked the state agencies to show that proportional equality 
existed—not prove  it.    Hospital Management, XtfVI,  5U. 
?With regard to medical facilities in N. C. it was stated, "The 
state committee found that facilities in the all Negro hospitals were not 
comparable with those in the state's leading or average white institutions." 
••Integration Battlefront," National Medical Aasociation Journal, LV, 57* 
TABLE 2 
PERCENTAGE OF HOSPITAL BEDS AVAILABLE TO NEGROES 
IN A MAJORITY OF NORTH CAROLINA HOSPITALS4 
Year 
Total Hospitals 
in N. C. Hospitals Assisted by the Duke Endowment 
Total 
Hospitals 
Total 
Beds 
Beds 
Available 
to nhites 
Beds 
Available 
to Negroes 
Percentage 
of Beds 
Available 
to Negroes 
19U0 
19U5 
1950 
1955 
I960 
179 
181 
171 
120 
120 
139 
1U5 
11*5 
7297 
8878 
10502 
12106 
1U875 
5UU3 
6552 
7508 
. J* 
110U9 
185U 
2326 
299U 
. .b 
38U6 
25.U 
26.5 
28.5 
25^8 
•Calculated from    "Statistical Profile of United States Hospitals," Hospitals Guide Issue, American 
Hospital Association Journal, XXV (June, 1951), 101j HI (August, 1956), U8; XXX7 (August, 19M.J, U2ZJ 
and Duke Endowment, "Statistics Relating to Beds Assigned for the Care of Negro Patients, 19UO-6U," 
August, 1966. 
bThe statistics necessary to make a complete entry were not given in Duke Endowment, "Statistics 
Relating to Beds Assigned for the Care of Negro Patients, 19U0-6U." 
« 
TABIE 3 
NEGRO PSRCENTABB OF NORTH CAROLINA POPULATION* 
Year 
Total Population 
of N. C. 
Negro Population 
of N. C. 
Negro Percentage 
of N. C. Population 
19U0 
1950 
I960 
3,571,623 
U,06l,929 
U,555,155 
981,298 
1,01*7,353 
1,116,021 
26,7 
25.7 
2U.5 
•Derived from:    U.  S. Bureau of the Census,  Statistical Abstract 
of the United States  (Washingtoni    U. S. Government Printing Office, 
1965), p. 11.  
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The real problem lay with the quota system itself.    In spite of 
proportional equality in availability of hospital beds, the North 
Carolina Advisory Committee received complaints that some hospitals 
aided by Hill-Burton funds had not maintained an adequate ratio or beds 
and space to meet the needs of Negro patients.8   By interpreting 
"equitable provision" for separate population groups to mean simply 
that 25 per cent of the population should be alloted 25 per cent of the 
medical facilities, the Public Health Service had overlooked the fact 
that the medical needs of a group might exceed its proportion of the 
population. 
Greensboro,  N. C» 
In 1962,  when suit was filed against two Greensboro hospital* 
and their directors,  the city had three major hospitals*    Moses H. 
Cone Memorial Hospital, Wesley Long Community Hospital, and L. Richardson 
Memorial Hospital.    Long admitted only while patients and maintained an 
all-white hospital staff.   Richardson served only the Negro population 
of Greensboro but had white as well as KigFQ doctors on its staff.    The 
racial policy of Cone was more complicated, however. 
Several months before the January, 19$3, opening of Cone Hospital, 
quite a furor was created by the hospital's proposed policy of admitting 
Negroes.    The problem was stated in a series of articles in the Greensboro 
Daily Newa.?   Richardson officials who had struggled for a number of 
8North Carolina Advisory Committee to the United States Commission 
on Civil Rights, Equal Protection g£thg Laws in North Carolina  (Washington* 
U. S. Governnent Printing 6ffice, KM), p. 10U» 
9Sam Stuart McKeel, "L. Richardson's Plight,"  November 23,  p. 1| 
Novemoer 2it, p. 1; November 25»  1952,  p. 1* 
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years to keep their hospital on an even keel financially feared that 
the opening of the new hospital would be a final blow. Although of- 
ficials at Cone had stated that admission of Negroes would be "controlled" 
(but had not yet set up a policy), it was felt that Negroes who were 
able to pay for medical care might patronize the new hospital. This 
would leave more indigents for Richardson, thus aggravating an already 
serious problem. 
In light of this situation,  the policy which the Board of Trustees 
of Cone Hospital adopted on December 11, 1952, was probably in the best 
interest of the  Richardson Hospital.^0    The Board decided that in order 
to be considered for admission to Cone,  a Negro must first have been 
admitted to Richardson Hospital.    If his medical condition required 
facilities and services not available at Richardson, but available at 
Cone,  a physician who was a member of the staffs of both hospitals  could 
make  a request for his transfer.    If the request were approved by the 
administrator of Richardson and the admitting office of Cone,  the patient 
was sent to Cone,  where he was under the care of the doctor making the 
request for transfer.    In February of I960,  the Board of Trustees  amended 
the rule to allow direct admission of Negro  patients to Cone under the 
same  conditions. 11 
10ln the Greensboro Dally News Public Pulse, Dr.  Jean C. McAlister 
stated,  "... I was an ex-officio member of the  L. Richardson Hospital 
Board of Trustees, and one of the fears of our board was that the Cone 
Hospital would put the L.  Richardson Hospital out of business if it 
opened its doors wide to  Negroes.    It was in the interest of protecting 
the L. Richardson Hospital that the Cone Hospital adopted the rule that 
Negro patients would be admitted only if the facilities of the L.  Richardson 
Hospital were inadequate for the care of a particular patient,   .   .   ." 
April 3, 1962, p.  8. 
^one Hospital's policy is given in detail in Greenberg et al., 
"Appellants* Appendix," p.  80a. 
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Cone Hospital admitted Negro emergency patients, althouch they 
were transferred to Richardson as soon as possible.    There were no 
"Jim Crow" waiting rooms,  rest rooms,  entrances or exits.    There were 
no separate wards for Negro patients although whites and Negroes were 
not placed together in the same rooms •        Cone, however, had a policy 
of excluding Negro doctors and dentists from its staff.    This meant 
that  if a Negro patient needed to be treated at Cone and had a Negro 
physician, he wa« forced to discharge him and go under the care of one 
of the white physicians who was a staff member of both hospitals.    This 
naturally worked a hardship on the Negro doctor as well as his patient. 
Negro physicians and dentists in Greensboro made several attempts 
to remedy the  situation before turning to the  courts.    Dr. George C. Simkins,-^ 
^Interview with Harold Bettis, Director of Cone Hospital,   September 
9, 1966. 
l^Dr. George C. Simkins, Jr., dentist and civil rights leader,  was 
born in Greensboro,  N. C.    He attended public schools in Greensboro; Herzl 
Junior College  in Chicago;  Talladega College in Alabama; and Meharry 
tedical School,  where he received his D.D.S. in 191*8.    After an intern- 
ship at Jersey City Medical Center, he came back to Greensboro where he 
was employed by the Guilford County Health Department until 1955,  when 
he entered private practice. 
In December,  1955, Dr. Simkins, an excellent golfer and tennis 
player (as his trophy case attests), was arrested for playing on the city's 
segregated Gillespie Park Golf Course.    Although the city had constructed 
and owned the course,  it had leased it to a private club which discrim- 
inated against  Negroes.    This incident led to a  significant decision in 
which the courts held that the right of citizens to use public property 
without discrimination on the basis of race may not be abridged by the 
mere leasing of the property.    City of Greensboro v.  Simkins, 2h9 F. Supp. 
562 (MJJ.N.C. 1956), 2li6 F. 2d W5(l*th Cir. 195V).   Later,  in 1962, 
Simkins was again forced to bring suit for discrimination, this time 
against  two hospitals, and Simkins v. Cone Hospital was the result. 
Dr.  Simkins has been active in the  National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People and has served as president of the Greensboro 
chapter for the past ten years.    Much of his time has been devoted to fight 
injustice, often at the expense of his professional career.    It is little 
wonder that he was named Msharry Medical School's "Alumnus of the Year" 
in 1966 and is regarded as the spokesman for the Negro community in 
Greensboro in all matters  involving discrimination. 
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a Negro dentist in Greensboro wrote letters to the officials of Cone 
and Long hospitals  in March,  I960, asking that Negro patients  be 
admitted to those institutions without restriction.    He also requested 
that Negro physicians and dentists be allowed to treat their patients 
in both.-"*    The problem was simple.    The Richardson Hospital was over- 
crowded and many patients who needed hospitalization could not get in. 
This difficulty could be resolved at least partially if Long would open 
its doors to Negroes and Cone would drop the restrictions it placed on 
their admission. 
Long Hospital acknowledged receipt of the requests  in April. 
A. 0.  Smith,  administrator of the hospital,  said the requests would  be 
given "due consideration," but no action was taken.*5    Harold Bettis, 
director of Cone Hospital,  sent the Negro doctors applications for 
admission to the staff, however,  and in May,  the Board of Trustees 
refused to accept their applications.1° 
Renewed requests for staff appointments were mace in late 1961 
and early 1962.    Dr. E. C.  Noel, in, President of the Greensboro 
Medical Society,  urged a '♦meeting of the minds," calling "prolonged 
controversy and litigation" an "obvious waste of tire, energy,  emotional 
tension,  and money.>M    There was,  however,  no meeting of the minds. 
Greensboro Record, April 6,  I960,  p. 1. 
^Greenberg et al.,  "Appellants' Appendix," p. 16a. 
^Ibid.,  p. 15«. 
^Greensboro Daily News, January 18,  1962,  p. 1. 
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To The Courts 
Dr. Sick ins had already begun to contemplate the possibility of 
going to court.    Early in lj»6l a man bad come into his office with an 
impacted molar and a temperature of 10U degrees.    He called Richardson 
to get a bed for the patient but there was no room.    He called Cone. 
There was room, but the patient could not be admitted.       The situation 
was not one which met the  conditions of the policy for admitting 
Negro patients.    Angered by the situation and feeling that this policy 
could not be defended in light of the hospital's receipt of Hill-Eurton 
funds,  Simkins wrote Jack Greenberg, General Counsel for the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People   (NAACP).    Greenberg 
replied that he was interested and would begin investigating the 
problem. 
In Greensboro,  the search for plaintiffs began.    Simkins found 
six physicians   (Drs. A. V. Blount,  Jr., Walter J. Hughes,  Norman N. Jones, 
Girardeau Alexander, E. C. Noel, III,  and F. E. Davis), two other dentists 
(Drs. Jttlton Barnes and W. L. T. Miller), and two patients  (A. J. Taylor 
and Donald R. Iyons) who were willing to sue with him.    But there was 
another obstacle.   Richardson Hospital   was putting on a building drive 
for funds and some Negro doctors in Greensboro felt that the suit should 
be delayed for fear that it might hurt the drive.    Consequently,  the 
Greensboro Medical Society tried to table the motion that suit be brought 
against the two hospitals.1?    Feeling it was a matter too important to 
l8Interview with George C. Simkins,  May, 196$. 
l?Ibid. 
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be delayed,   Simkins instructed his lawyer to file the suit and "let 
them read about it in the paper."20 
The complaint was filed February 12, 1%2,  in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina in Greensboro 
by the plaintiffs' attorneys  (Jack Greenberg, his assistants James M, 
tfabrit, III,  and Michael Meltsner,  and Conrad 0. Pearson,  State Counsel 
for the NAACP).    The complaint stated that the six physicians and three 
dentists,  all residents of Greensboro,  sought admission to the staffs 
of Long and Cone hospitals but were denied this on the basis of race. 
Plaintiff A. J. Taylor had a gastric ulcer which required constant 
medical attention and he desired to enter either hospital and be treated 
by his own physician, Dr. E. C.  Noel.    Plaintiff Donald R. Lyons was 
suffering from an impacted molar and desired it removed in either of 
the hospitals by his dentist, Dr. George C. Simkins.    Neither hospital 
would admit these patients and their physician or dentist to its facil- 
ities.    The  physicians and dentists claimed that they were suffering 
irreparable  injury,  including loss of earning and "deprivation of 
opportunity to develop the skills necessary for continued proficiency 
of their chosen professions.*21    The plaintiff patients held that the 
hospitals'  policies caused them irreparable injury, "including deprivation 
of the opportunity of receiving medical care in the most complete medical 
facilities available in their locality and the use of said facilities 
20lbid. 
Greenberg etal.,  "Appellants' Appendix," p. 16a. 
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with the treatment of their own physicians and dentists."22 
As a remedy,  the plaintiffs requested two injunctions against the 
defendant hospitals and their directors.    The first would restrain the 
hospitals from enforcing the policy of denying staff privileges to the 
plaintiff physicians and dentists.    The second would halt discrimination 
against Negro patients.    In addition,  the court was asked to declare 
the "separate but equal" provision of the Hill-Burton Act    and the 
accompanying Public Health Service Regulation unconstitutional because 
they deprived the plaintiffs of rights,  privileges,   and immunities 
guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.23 
Long Hospital was given until April 2 and Cone until April 6 to 
file their answers to the complaint.    On April 2, Charles E. Both, 
attorney for Cone Hospital and Harold Bettis,  and Thornton H. Brooks, 
attorney for Long Hospital and A. 0.  Smith, filed a motion to dismiss 
the suit because the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, 
by reason of the fact that the suit was one "brought by individuals  seeking 
redress for the alleged invasion of their civil rights by private cor- 
porations and other individuals."2^    The prohibitions against racial 
22 
p. 19. 
Ibid.,  p. 17a. 
23For the text of the provision and regulation in question see 
2i*Greenberg etal.,  "Appellants' Appendix," p. 19a. 
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discrimination stated in the  fifth and fourteenth amendments are directed 
against federal and state governments—not private corporations or in- 
dividuals.  -*    In order to be within the  jurisdiction of a federal  court, 
the invasion of the plaintiffs'  right3 must be by government or its 
agent.    Thus,  the most important issue in the  case was stated at its 
very outset.    Could the actions of these two hospitals be  labeled "state 
action"? 
In reply,  on May hf  1962,  the plaintiffs filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction that would admit them immediately to the hospitals.-0 
On the same day they moved for a summary judgment on the ground that no 
genuine issue of fact existed in the case.2?    Four days later,  on May 8, 
1962,  the United States Department of Justice filed a motion to intervene 
on behalf of the plaintiffs because the  constitutionality of an act of 
Congress that affected the public interest was  drawn into question,-3 
25in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment,  this had been clearly 
states by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases of 1383.    Congress 
had passed the Civil Rights Act of 1H75 which made it a crime for any 
person to deny to  any other person equal enjoyment of the accommodations, 
facilities,  and privileges of inns,  public transportation, and places of 
public amusement.    The Court declared the law unconstitutional on the 
grounds that Congress had no power to pass a law enforcing the prohibitions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment against private persons,  for that amendment 
says that no state  shall deny to  any person the equal protection of the 
laws,  or deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process 
of law.    In the words of Justice Bradley,  "It  is State action of a particular 
character that is prohibited.    Individual invasion of individual rights is 
not the  subject-matter of the Amendment."    The Civil Rights Cases,  109 U. S. 3 
(1883). 
26Greenberg et al.,  "Appellants' Appendix," p. 68a. 
27Ibid., p. 72a. 
28The  right of the United States to intervene in such cases  is 
provided by United States Code,  Title 28,  Sec. 2U03. 
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The "separate but equal"  clause of the Hill-Burton Act was a 
sore spot elsewhere,  also.    In April, 1962, the Federal Hospital Council 
approved a resolution calling for the revision of the "separate but 
equal" provision.2?    Several bills designed to end discrimination in 
the Hill-Burton pro>a*am had already been introduced into Congress.3** 
It was  in the midst of these attempts to revise the law that the Justice 
Department moved to intervene  in the Sinkins case and eliminate the 
discriminatory provision by court action. 
Action taken by the legislative branch would have a substantially 
different result from that of judicial action.    Because Congress rarely 
acts retroactively,  it could only prohibit discrimination in hospitals 
receiving Hill-Burton funds in the  future.    While a legislative change 
would act prospectively,  a declaration in the courts that the provision 
was unconstitutional would have a retroactive effect.    Hospitals that 
had received money under the Hill-Burton Act in 19U7 would be just as 
subject to the consequences of the decision as those receiving funds 
after the decision. 
President Kennedy stated that he thought the approach through the 
courts was tactically preferabli'to legislative one, and he directed 
the Department of Justice to associate itself with the plaintiffs in 
the Simkins case.31    The change from legislative to Judicial ground 
hospitals, American Hospital Association Journal,  XXJC7I  (August, 
1962), 96. 
30For a discussion of the recent history of attempts to amend the 
Hill-Burton Act to eliminate discrimination in the program see Chapter VI, 
31William M. Cobb,  "John Fitzgerald Kennedy,  1919-1963,* National 
Medical Association Journal, LVI  (November, 196U),  2. 
considerably changed the point in question.    The issue was not whether 
the hospitals would continue to receive federal funds if they discrimk- 
nated against Negroes:    the issue was only whether the hospitals could 
discriminate. 
On June 26, 1°62, Chief Jud«e Edwin If. Stanley presided over a 
day-long hearing on the four motions that had been filed.    He  ruled in 
favor of federal intervention in the suit,  but he denied the plaintiffs' 
motion for a temporary injunction.    Rulings on the defendants' motion 
for dismissal and the plaintiffs' motion for a summary judgment were 
deferred until after July 31.    Since both parties agreed that only 
legal issues were disputed, the court directed them to file their facts, 
conclusions based on the evidence, and any further briefs that either 
wished to submit by July 20.    These were then to be exchanged and the 
parties given until July 31 to file any objections. 
The Reaction 
The suit was almost immediately recognized as one of potential 
significance,  especially for racial integration of medical facilities* 
The Greensboro Record noted that the case "might have far reaching 
results in communities which have used federal funds under the Hill- 
Burton Act in construction of hospitals.   Reportedly more than 2,000 
hospitals in the South have made use of federal funds »■»*    The Greensboro 
Daily News  suggested "intelligent mediation" as an alternative to 
prolonged litigation and race bitterness.33   It was also felt that the 
^February 12, 1962, p. 1. 
^February *U»  1962,  p. 8. 
lawsuit came at an unfortunate time.    It might jeopardize the L. Rich- 
ardson fund-raising drive; and whatever happened in the case,  there 
would still be a need for these additional hospital beds,  since most 
Negroes would probably continue to prefer their own hospital.^ 
There was no attempt to reach a compromise agreement outside 
the courts, however.    The potential effect of the lawsuit on a 100-bed 
addition to the Richardson Hospital was outweighed by its possible 
effect on some 6,000 hospitals throughout the United States.    Litigation 
had begun. 
3k)reensboro Daily News, May 10, 1962, p. 8, 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DISTOCT COURT 
Findings of Pact 
All briefs and the responses to them were filed by July 30,  1962. 
On the basis of these submissions, the District Court made extensive 
"findings of fact.*1 
Cone Hospital was originally incorporated in 1911.    There were 
ten original incorporators, all private citizens, who became its first 
Board of Trustees.    The legislative charter, applied for in order to 
provide for a Board of Trustees with perpetual succession, was enacted 
in 1913.    It established a board of fifteen members*   three to be ap- 
pointed by the Governor of North Carolina, one by the City Council of 
Greensboro, one by the Board of Commissioners of Guilford County,  one 
by the Guilford County Medical Society,  one by the Board of Commissioners 
of Watauga County, and the remaining eight by Mrs. Bertha L. Cone as 
long as she lived.2   After the death of Mrs. Cone, the eight trustees 
appointed by her were to perpetuate themselvew by election.    In 1961, 
•••In the discussion which follows I have relied heavily on the 
District Court decision,  Simkins v. Cone Hospital,  211 F.  Supp. 628 
(M.D.N.C. 1962) which contains the fact3 of the case as well as the basic 
arguments of plaintiffs and defendants. 
2?frs. Bertha L. Cone, wife of Moses H. Cone, died in 19h7.    She 
was the founder and principal benefactor of the hospital. 
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the  charter was amended to eliminate the appointment cCf one trustee by 
the Board of Commissioners of Watauga County, and to provide that the 
original appointee of that board also be perpetuated through election. 
Since 1911 the  corporation aad owned the  real property on which the 
hospital was built, and its Board of Trustees h=.d exclusive control over 
all real and personal property of the corporation as well as its insti- 
tutional services and activities. 
Two grants under the Hill-Burton Act had been approved for Cone 
Hospital,  one in 195U,  the other in I960.    The  funds appropriated for 
Cone by the federal government  ($1,26?,950.00)  amounted to approximately 
15 per cent of the total construction costs of the two projects  ($7,367,023.32). 
Cone Hospital h.id permitted the Agricultural and Technical College 
of North Carolina  (since 195U) and the Woman's College of the University 
of North Carolina  (since 1957), both tax-supported state institutions, 
to use  its facilities in the training of their nursing students.    The 
student nurses carried out assignments under the supervision of their own 
teachers,  not of the hospital staff.    They did not replace any personnel 
on the staff, and the hospital had no priority in the employment of nurses 
graduating from either college.    The hospital provided conference  rooms 
for the use of the schools without charge and subsidized the students» 
meals  and laundry service.    Its connection with the Agricultural and 
Technical College program had cost it $3,337.59, which it paid from its 
own funds.    To  the nursing program of Woman's College,  Cone had contributed 
$131,835.13, in addition to $10,500*00 given that institution for 
scholarship loans to student nurses.    The plaintiffs and defendants 
Uo 
agreed that "the monetary value of the services rendered the hospital 
by the student nurses is not commensurate with the substantial con- 
tributions the hospital has made of both its funds and facilities to 
the furtherance of the nursing programs."3 
Long Hospital,  like Cone,  was a non-profit  corporation which 
owned the real property on which it was located.    Its charter of 
corporation made its twelve-member Board of Trustees, all citizens 
of Greensboro,  a self-perpetuating body.    Die Board of Trustees was 
vested with exclusive control over the real and personal property of 
the corporation and Its institutional services and activities* 
Three Hill-Burton grants (in June, 1959, April, 1961, and Decem- 
ber,  1961) had been approved for Long Hospital.    The sum of $1,9U8,800.00 
had been appropriated for these projects,  approximately 50 per cent of 
their total cost ($3,927,335.UO). 
Both defendant hospitals were exempt from ad valorem taxes assessed 
by the City of Greensboro and Guilford County and both were licensed 
by the State of North Carolina.    Since the North Carolina State Plan 
(approved by the Surgeon General of the United States) had programmed 
separate hospital facilities for separate population groups in the 
Greensboro area, each hospital had received the grants, through the 
North Carolina Medical Care Commission, with the written understanding 
that admission to the proposed facilities might be denied because of 
3simkins v. Cone Hospital, 211 F. Supp. 628 (U.D.N.C. 1962), 
race, creed or color.1* 
There was no dispute between plaintiffs and defendants with 
regard to the facts of the case.    Both parties admitted that the plaintiffs 
had sought admission to the facilities of the defendant hospitals and 
had been denied this because of their race.    But what was the significance 
of the facts put before the court?    Here the plaintiffs and defendants 
differed considerably. 
Plaintiffs• Argument 
State Action 
The plaintiffs attempted to demonstrate that the defendants1 
relationships with government were sufficient to place them under the 
restraints of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. 
Five points of contact with government, two of which did not apply to 
Long Hospital,  ware  discussed. 
Since six members of the Cone Hospital Boaid of Trustees were 
appointed by public officials or agencies,  the plaintiffs argued that 
the private character of the institution was affected.    They supported 
their position by reference to the decision in Commonwealth of Penn- 
sylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of City of Philadelphia, 
353 U. S. 230 (1957).    In that case,  the Supreme Court held that die- 
crimination against Negro applicants to Girard College, a trust which 
Uln the 195U application for a grant, Cone gave assurance that 
the hospital would be operated without discrimination because of race, 
creed or color, but in the later application it stated that the hospital 
had erroneously represented that  the facilities would be operated with- 
out discrimination.    A waiver of the nondiscrimination assurance was 
permitted. 
1*2 
was administered by a board of trustees created by the state legislature, 
was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.    Although the 
limitations put on the use of money placed in the  trust  (a school for 
poor, male,  white orphans) had been stipulated by the individual 
establishing it, the fact that it was administered by a state agency 
brought the college under the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Thus, the Supreme Court had held that the state could not participate 
in the administration of a private trust which drew racial distinctions, 
and the plaintiffs alleged that the state,  through the appointment of 
six trustees,  was participating in the administration of Cone Hospital. 
The  second point of government contact which applied only to Cone 
was its involvement  in the nursing programs of two state-supported 
institutions.    In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
state was aiding the  hospitals    "In the course of said training these 
student nurses substantially contribute, without  charge to the hospital, 
valuable nursing services for which it would otherwise pay substantial 
sums."5    In reply,  Cone Hospital demonstrated that the contributions 
made by the student nurses were outweighed by the aid that the hospital 
gave the nursing programs .^    Plaintiffs then altered their original 
argument and held that because Cone assisted the state,  it was carrying 
on the work of the state and therefore became its instrument. 
The third and fourth connections with government, exemption fro» 
ad valorem taxes and licensure by the state of North Carolina, applied 
^Greenberg et al., "Appellants' Appendix," p. 12a. 
6Ibid., pp. 55a-59». 
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to both hospitals.    Although each contact was not  in itself sufficient 
to satisfy the  state action requirement, both were argued to be additional 
significant factors  in the totality of state involvenent with the two 
hospitals. 
'the last nexus with government,  participation in the Hill-Burton 
program,  the plaintiffs considered the most  important.    The federal 
funds allocated to the hospitals and the requirement for plans and 
specifications to meet the standards established for hospital construction 
and equipment by the Public Health Service Regulations were important 
involvements with government, they argued.    In addition, the federal 
funds were  allocated to hospitals through a state agency, the North 
Carolina Medical Care Comr.ission, ittich had the responsibility of planning 
for sti.te-wide Medical facilities.    These  conditions,  they felt,  should 
add considerable weight on the scale of state action. 
The application of constitutional restraints to the defendants, 
however,  did not depend on any one of these aspects of government in- 
volvement.    The plaintiffs argued that government action had to be 
viewed as a totality.    They referred to Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961) to support their position.    In Burton 
the Court discussed the contacts that a restaurant had with government 
and concluded:    "Addition of all these activities,  . .  . together with 
the obvious fact that the restaurant  is operated as an integral part of 
a public building devoted to a public parking service,  indicates that 
degree  of state participation and involvenent in discriminatory action 
which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn."    As 
kh 
in the Burton case,  plaintiffs reasoned,  the sum of the connections 
between the state and the two hospitals was sufficient to satisfy the 
state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Question of Constitutionality 
If the hospitals were subject to constitutional limitations, 
then,  the plaintiffs  asserted,  the court must declare the "separate 
but equal* provision of the Hill-Burton Act unconstitutional for it 
was the law which sanctioned the defendants •  conduct.    The Hill-Burton 
Act and the federal regulation in question authorized the construction 
of separate facilities for separate population groups.    Because separate 
facilities had, since 195k, been held a violation of the fourteenth and 
fifth amendments, Congress's authorization of such practices, the 
plaintiffs felt, was  clearly contraiy to the Constitution.    In the 
words of Burke Marshall, "What the Constitution forbids,  Congress may 
not sanction.    It is  clear,  therefore,  that Congress may not enact a 
statute authorizing a hospital construction program based on a separate- 
but-equal formula,  and a state may not administer such a program."' 
7Burke Marshall et al., "Memorandum of the United States:   In the 
United States District CourT for the Middle District of North Carolina, 
Greensboro Division,  G. C. Sijnkins,  Jr., et al. v. Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital et al.," (1962), p. 21.    Hereafter cited as "Memorandum of the 
United States:    In the United States District Court." 
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Defendants' Position 
A Private Institution 
In the defendants' view, the hospitals were private corporations 
and therefore able to discriminate if they chose.    They dealt with each 
point the plaintiffs had brought up and concluded that if no single 
one of the contacts with government were sufficient to render the hospitals 
instruments of the state  (and plaintiffs did not argue that they were), 
then the same would be true with respect to the total of such contacts. 
In addition, the courts had already ruled in Eaton v. James Walker Memorial 
Hospital,  a very similar case, which,  should control the instant case,^ 
In Eaton,  suit was brought against the Board of Managers of 
James Walker Memorial Hospital for racial discrimination.    The land on 
which the hospital was built was conveyed to it by the City of Wilmington 
and  New Hanover County to be held in trust by the hospital so long as 
it was maintained for the benefit of the city and county.    In case of 
disuse or abandonment,  the property was to revert to the city and county. 
A majority of the original members of the hospital's self-perpetuating 
Board of Managers was appointed by public authorities.    Prior to l°5l» 
the  city and county made direct annual contributions for the supvort of 
the hospital.    Walker Hospital had also received federal funds  for 
expansion and maintenance of the hospital under the Defense Public Works 
Act of 19U0.    It was licensed by the state of North Carolina and was 
exempt from ad valorem taxes.    The courts found no state action and 
the  case was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
^Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hospital,  261 
F.  2d 52rTHth Cir. 195«),  cert, denied, 395 U.  S.  ?du  (W). 
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Except for the  connection of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital 
with the nursing programs of the two colleges, there was no point of 
contact between government and Cone and Long hospitals that was not 
in the Eaton case.    Moreover, there were a number of contacts present 
in Eaton that were not found in the Sinking case—the possibility of 
reverter,  city and county contributions, and a majority of the Board 
of Managers appointed by public authority.    Therefore, defendants 
reasoned,  if the Walker Hospital were a private institution, did it 
not logically follow that Cone and Long were also? 
The Hill-Burton Issue 
The defendants maintained that the constitutionality of the 
"separate but equal" provisions of the Hill-Burton Act and federal 
regulations was completely irrelevant.    The hospitals did not reJy on 
these provisions to carry on discrimination against Negroes.    Discrim- 
ination was their prerogative because they were private corporations— 
they did not assume this right by virtue of permiesion by the government. 
Moreover,  they argued, the issue of constitutionality would be irrelevant 
even if the hospitals were instrumentalities of government because 
they would then be subject to the  constitutional amendments forbidding 
discrimination and the Hill-Burton Act could neither authorize nor 
excuse violations  of these amendments. 
The Decision 
After he heard the srganents, Judge Stanley stated that the 
"... sole question for determination is whether the defendants have 
U7 
been shown to be so impressed with a public interest as to render them 
instrumentalities of government, and thus within the reach of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States."? 
To determine whether the hospitals were public corporations in the 
constitutional sense, the  court examined each of the aspects of govern- 
ment involvement the plaintiffs had presented. 
Stanley quickly disposed of the matter of the appointment of the 
Cone Hospital Board of Trustees.    Six members of the fifteen-member 
board were appointed by public officers or agencies.    Since these members 
were clearly in a minority on the board, the private trustees were in 
control of the corporation.    It is control by a public authority, not 
merely the appointment of trustees by public authority, Judge Stanley 
held, that makes a corporation public.10   In reply to the plaintiffs' 
reliance on Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City 
Trusts of City of Philadelphia, he cited the fact that the Board of 
Directors was a body created by the Pennsylvania Legislature, thus a 
state agency, and concluded, "No case has been cited or found which 
gSimkina v. Cone Hospital, 211 F. Supp. 628 (MJJ.N.C. 1962). 
l°Stanley supported his opinion by reference to Norris v.Jtoyor 
and City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. U5l (D. Md. 19UB) in which 
the  court decided1 "The legal test between a private and public corpora- 
tion is whether the corporation is subject to control by public authority, 
state or municipal.    To make a corporation public,  its manager, trustees, 
or directors must be not only appointed by public authority but subject 
to its control."    He also quoted the concurring <&**»*** ^gSEHgi 
College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. (U Wheat.) $18 (1819)a    -When the corpora- 
tion £ said, at the bar, to be public, it is not merely meant that 
the whole community may be the proper objects of p»*gr»*»g* 
the government have the sole right, as trustees «"*******2~*' 
to regulate,  control and direct the corporation,  and its funds and its 
franchises,  at  its own good will and pleasure." 
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holds that the appointment of a minority of trustees by public officers 
or agencies converts the character of the corporation from private to 
public."11    The first point of government  contact with Cone Hospital 
was thus ruled insignificant. 
Cone Hospital's participation In the student nursing programs 
of two state-supported colleges was deemed purely voluntary.    Stanley 
answered the plaintiff's argument that by the giving,  rather than 
receiving, of assistance to the state Cone Hospital had become its 
agent by again bringing up the question of control.    "There is no 
suggestion that either educational institution exercises any control 
whatever over the hospital,  or attempts to direct any of its policies."12 
Therefore, the involvement in the student nursing program in no way 
affected the character of the hospital. 
It was  concluded that the exemption from ad valorem taxes was 
not a factor to be considered.    Although both hospitals were exempt, 
the same was true of the property owned by other private,  religious, 
educational,  and charitable organizations.    "Surely it cannot be said 
that a purely local church,  school or hospital becomes an instrumentality 
of the  state,  and subject to its control,  by simply having its property 
exempt from ad valorem taxes.    No authority has been cited for such a 
proposition."1^ 
llSimkins v. Cone Hospital, 211 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1962) 
^Ipid. 
i^bid. 
U9 
The licensing of the defendant hospitals was held to be similar 
to the licensing of restaurants.    In Williams v. Howard Johnson's 
Restaurant the court had decided that the restaurant was not involved 
in state action merely because  it was licensed by the state i 
The statute /restaurant licensing law/ is obviously 
designed to protect the health of the community but it 
does not authorize state officials to control the 
management of the business or to dictate what persona 
shall be served.lM 
Stanley reasoned that, like licenses issued to restaurants, the hospital 
licensing statutes and regulations were "... designed to protect the 
health of persons served by the facility, and do not authorize any 
public officials to exert any control whatever over management of the 
business of the hospital,  or to dictate what persons shall be served 
by the facility."15    He went on to say that members of practically all 
professions and most businesses were required to be licensed by the 
state, and to hold that all these persons and businesses wre therefore 
agents of the state would "... go completely beyond anything that 
has ever bean suggested by the courts."   And so the fourth point of 
government contact with the hospitals was also ruled insignificant. 
Finally, there remained to be considered the hospitals' receipt 
of federal funds under the Hill-Burton Act.    In Judge Stanley's opinion, 
the funds should be considered unrestricted grants because neither 
hospital relied on the provisions of the Act or their agreement with 
the North Carolina Medical Care Commission to carry on discriminatory 
Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant,  268 F. 2d 8U5  (Uth Cir. 
1959), quoted by Judge Stanley. 
I5simkins v. Cone Hospital,  211 F. Supp. 628 (M.D.N.C. 1962). 
50 
policies.    Nor were the requirements and standards for the construction 
and equipment of hospitals to be treated as elements of government control 
ovf.r the hospitals.    The mere contribution of money by the government 
was also held insufficient to render the hospitals subject to the 
restrictions of the fourteenth and fifth amendments.1"    Judge Stanley 
combined all of these points and concluded! 
Since no state or federal agency has the right to exercise 
any supervision or control over the operation of either 
hospital by virtue of their use of Hill-Burton funds, 
other than factors relating to the sound construction 
and equipment of the facilities,  and inspections to insure 
the maintenance of proper health standards, and since 
control, rather than contribution, is the decisive factor 
in determining the public character of a corporation, it 
necessarily follows that the receipt of unrestricted 
Hill-Burton funds by the defendant hospitals in no way 
transforms the hospitals into public agencies.1? 
Even at this point, however,  the decision could have still been 
in favor of the plaintiffs.    They had not contended that each contact 
with government, taken individually, would change the  character of the 
l6Stanley referred to two cases to support this opinion.    In Eaton, 
the land on which Walker Hospital was built had been donated by the city 
and county governments and annual donations were made to the hospital 
by both governmental bodies for many years.    The court had held these 
contributions not sufficient to make the hospital subject to the pro- 
hibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.    In Khoury v. Community Memorial 
Hospital,  203 Va. 236, 123 S. E. 2d 533 (lS6277the hospital being sued 
had received more than half its construction funds from the f^al 
government under the Hill-Burton Act and the remainder from the Comon- 
wealth of Virginia and local subscriptions.    The court held th«a the 
hospital fell within the definition of a private corporationbecause it 
was not owned by the federal or state government  <e^V °^<t^nfSera 
its construction possible by the contribution of funds), and its officers 
were not representatives of government nor were they appointed by 
representatives of government. 
lTsimkins v. Cone Hospital,  211 F. Supp. 628  (M.D.N.C. 1*>2). 
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hospitals from private to public,  but,  rather, that it was the sum of 
these contacts—the totality of government involvement—that was im- 
portant.    Stanley dismissed the Burton case, on which they relied for 
this theory,  as a "leasing case," and said, » .  .   . if neither of the 
contacts they have with a public agency makes them an instrumentality 
of government,  the same result would necessarily follow with respect to 
the total of such contacts*    In other words  .  .   .  zero multiplied by 
any number would still equal zero.*l" 
Neither hospital then, the court decided, was sufficiently in- 
volved with government to lose its private character.    But what of the 
constitutionality of the "separate but equal" provision of the Hill- 
Burton Act?    Were the plaintiffs due the declaratory relief they sought? 
No, ruled the court.    The plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge 
the Hill-Burton Act.    The law did not deprive them of their constitutional 
rights because the defendants did not claim any right or privilege under 
its provisions.    Since courts avoid rendering a decision on a constitutional 
question unless it is absolutely necessary to the disposition of the case, 
the Hill-Burton Act, ruled Judge Stanley, was not at issue. 
The motion for summary judgment by the plaintiffs was denied and 
the defendants» motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction 
was granted. 
l8Ibid, 
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The Aftermath 
On December 8, 1962,  it was announced that the December 5 ruling 
of the District Court would be appealed .^    Two weeks after the decision 
in its favor,  on December 19, the Cone Hospital Board of Trustees announced 
that it had decided to consider applications from Negro physicians and 
dentists on the same basis as other applicants and haci sent letters 
notifying the  Negro professionals of its decision.?0   The policy with 
respect to Negro patients, however, was not altered.    Long Hospital made 
no change in its racial policies.    Despite the gesture,  notices of appeal 
by the NAACP lawyers and the U. S. Department of Justice were filed 
Janaury h and January 11,  1963,  respectively. 
l^Greensboro Daily News,  December 8,  1962, p. 7. 
2QGreensboro Record, December 19, 1962,  p. 1. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TWICE APPEALED 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
On April 1,  1963, the arguments of appellants and appellees were 
heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 
Because of the importance of the questions  involved in the case,  Chief 
Judge Sobeloff and Circuit Judges Haynsworth, Boreman,  Bryan, and Bell 
heard the appeal sitting en banc.1    The case was decided on November 1, 
1963. 
The Majority Opinion 
Chief Judge  Sobeloff, writing the opinion for the majority,  began 
by stating that the lower court had erred in its structure of the essential 
ipull names of the judges aret    Simon E.  Sobeloff, Clement F. 
Haynsworth,  Jr.,  Herbert S. Boreman,  Albert V. Bryan,  J. Spencer Bell. 
There are eleven United States Courts of Appeal, one for each of the 
ten numbered circuits and one for the District of Columbia.    The number 
of judges appointed to each  court varies from three to nine,  and usually 
cases are heard by a three-judge division of the court.    However,  a 
majority of the active circuit judges in a circuit may vote to order a 
hearing before the court en banc.    Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure specifies that such a hearing will not ordinarily De oraered 
except *»(i) ^Bn consideration by the full court is necessary to secure 
or maintain uniformity of its decisions,  or (2) when the proceeding 
involves a question of exceptional importance." In U. S., Federal Rules 
of Civil P^ceriure and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure  (St. Paul, 
Mnn.t    West Publishing Co., 196H).    The enbanc procedure-has the 
advantage of avoiding conflicting views within a circuit and tends to 
make the court of appeal's decision final. 
5U 
question: 
In the first place we would formulate the initial question 
differently to avoid the erroneous view that for an other- 
wise private  body to be subject to the antidiscrimination 
requirements of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments 
it must actually be "render /ed aq7 instrumentalit/y7 of 
government * * *."    In our view the initial question is, 
rather, whether the state or the federal government,  or 
both, have become so involved in the conduct of these 
otherwise private bodies that their activities are also 
the activities of these governments and performed under 
their aegis without the private body necessarily becoming 
either their instrumentality or their agent in a strict 
sense.2 
Sobeloff ruled that Burton,  as the plaintiff-appellants had 
interpreted that decision, was controlling in this case,    while he 
accepted the appellants' theory, however, he did not accept the totality 
of government involvements that they suggested.    Instead,  only one of 
the five points of government contact presented by the appellants was 
used to establish "state action." 
Sobeloff found the necessary degree of state involvement to be 
present as a result of the hospitals• participation in the Hill-Burton 
program.    Ibis program, he held,  subjected the defendant-appellees  to 
an "elaborate and intricate pattern of governmental regulations."    Four 
categories of regulations were deemed most important.    First,  the Hill- 
Burton Act provided that if within twenty years after completion of 
a project the hospital changed status,  the United States could recover 
a proportionate share of its grant to that hospital.3    Second, hospitals 
2Simkin» v. Cone Hospital, 323 F. 2d 959 (J»th Cir. 1963). 
3rhis provision could be invoked if the hospital ceased to be 
"nonprofit" or^f it were sold to anyone not qualified to apply ior 
uncer the Hill-Burton Act. 
aid 
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receiving assistance were requir.d to render hospital services in 
accordance  to specified minimum standards.    No federal grants could 
be allocated to any state which did not enact legislation requiring 
compliance with these standards .**    Third, the Hill-Burton Act provided 
for federal decision as to the number of hospital beds and facilities 
necessary to provide adequate service in a state,  for the method of 
distribution of facilities  in a state, and for the general way in 
which a state agency should determine the priority of projects.    Fourth, 
the state was required to submit a state plan of hospital construction 
which had to meet the requirements of nondiscriraination and furnishing 
hospital services to people unable to pay for them. 
As a result of these  involvements with government  (state and 
federal), the majority concluded that, just as the Supreme Court in 
Burton attached major significance to the  fact that the restaurant was 
operated as an integral part of a public building devoted to a public 
parking service, so also ■ ... we find it significant here   that the 
defendant hospitals operate as integral parts of comprehensive joint or 
intermeshing state and federal plans or programs designed to effect a 
proper allocation of available medical and hospital resources  for  .   .  . 
promotion and maintenance of public health."-' 
Sobeloff added that not every endowment by federal or state govern- 
ment automatically involves  the beneficiary in "state action" nor was it 
**North Carolina, to meet these require.-nents, enacted a Hospital 
Licensing Act in 1?U7 which provided in detail for the management of 
hospitals.    All hospitals  in the state were required to be licensed, 
however,  not just those receiving federal funds. 
5Simkina v. Cone Hospital, 323 F. 2d 959 (Uth Cir. 1963). 
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necessary to delineate the legal rule as it mi,^ht operate in any other 
case.    "Our concern is with the Hill-Burton program, and examination 
of its functioning leads to the conclusion that we have state action 
here."6 
The court held that the plaint iff-appellants did have standing 
to challenge  the Hill-3urton Act and asserted "To make any relief 
effective it becomes necessary to pass upon the validity of the statute 
and the regulation,  because they contain an affirmative sanction of 
the unconstitutional practice."7    Thus,  the provisions of the Hill- 
Burton Act and federal regulation in question were declared unconsti- 
tutional under the due process clause  of the Fifth Amendment and the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.    The decision 
of the District Court was reversed and the case was remanded with 
directions to grant the requested injunctive relief. 
The Dissent 
Two judges disagreed with the majority.    Circuit Judge Haynsworth 
wrote a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Judje Boreman. 
The dissenters held that the majority had distorted the purposes and 
actual operation of the Hill-Burton Act.    They noted that the law itself 
provided that nothing in it should be construed as giving any federal 
officer or employee any right of supervision or control over any hospital 
receiving grants under the act.    The power of the Surgeon General to 
6Xbid. 
7ibid. 
57 
approve or disapprove state plans and applications was the only ex- 
ception.     Since this did not result in a continuing right of control 
by the Surgeon General,  Haynsworth  reasoned,  "subsequent operation of 
a hospital which had received a grant in aid of a construction program 
was not to  be federal action."° 
Nor did the state of North Carolina exercise control over the 
hospitals.    In 1°U6 the state's General Assembly enacted a statute 
authorizing the  North Carolina Medical Care Commission to survey and 
determine  the need for hospital facilities.    This commission was merely 
empowered to perform administrative duties, Haynsworth stated, not to 
exercise regulatory or supervisory functions over the operation of 
private nonprofit hospitals.    In his opinion,  the Hill-Burton Act, and 
the North Carolina statute  related to it, simply provided the machinery 
by which a hospital might apply for a grant in aid of  construction. 
The  government's standards of maintenance and operation and its 
right to regain part of a grant if the hospital should change status 
(in the manner prescribed) within twenty years were,  in Haynsworth's 
view, "...  no more than a necessary provision for the protection of 
public moneys against unreasonable profligacy."?   Any government subsidi- 
zation carries with it certain terms and he added,  "The truth is plain. 
This scheme for grants in aid to hospitals differs neither in kind nor 
8Tbid. 
9Ibid. 
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degree from any other provision for grants in aid of private endeavor."10 
The state plan, in the dissenters' opinion,was "   ...  no more 
than a survey of existing facilities to be utilized as a basis for 
judgment as to the relative need of such additional facilities as 
.night be proposed by local governmental bodies or private nonprofit 
corporations or groups•***•    The two hospitals played the same role 
before they received the grants as they did afterward.    Their facilities 
were taken into account and were relevant to the determination of the 
need of additional facilities in their area before they received the 
grants.    Thus, whether the improvements had been made with or without 
government aid,  they would have affected the state plan in the same 
way.    Haynsworth concluded,  "If then, the operation of these hospitals 
was not state action before their receipt of the grants in aid,  * 
determination that their operation is now state action depends wholly 
upon the fact that they received the grants in aid.*12    The dissenters 
added that the proposals made in Congress to eliminate discrimination 
in the Hill-Burton program gave sup.ort to their view that Congress had 
no idea that grants through the projjram would render the recipient 
private hospitals subject to the fifth and fourteenth amendments.    The 
legislative branch,  not the judicial, they felt, was the proper arena 
for the resolution of the question. 
10Ibid. 
uIbid. 
12lbld. 
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The United States Supreme Court 
The issues in this case appeared to be debatable—the District 
Court rendered a judgment in favor of the hospitals,  and a three-to-two 
decision, as was  the Court of Appeals',  is usually considered weak. 
So on January 20,  196k,  the defendant-appellees petitioned the Supreme 
Court  for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals  for the Fourth 
Circuit. 
Roth and Brooks,  lawyers for the two hospitals and their ad- 
ministrators,  cited a variety of reasons for granting the writ.    They 
accepted Judge Haynsworth's reasoning and argued,  "The present  case 
would appear to be the  first in which it has ever been held that the 
mere contribution of Federal funds to a private agency is sufficient 
to characterize the subsequent operations of the agency as State action.nl3 
Not only was the decision unprecedented,  in their opinion;  its  impli- 
cations were "staggering.*    Although the Circuit Court did not formulate 
the precise rule it followed,  and stated that not every contribution 
from government automatically involves the recipient in "state action," 
the petitioners argued,  "...  it is equally true that under the decision 
of the majority every subvention by the federal or state government is 
automatically suspect until the matter is litigated and the innocence 
of the grant established-perhaps, as here, long after it was made."^ 
13charles E. Roth and Thornton H. BI-OOKS, "In the Supreme Court 
of the United States, October Term, 1963, The Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital et al., Petitioners v. G. C. Simkins et al. and United States 
of America, Intervenor, Respondents, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the 'J**^^*'* <J*J>» 
P. 6.    Hereafter cited as, "In the Supreme Court:    Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari." 
^Ibid.,  p. 8. 
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They continued,  "... the uncertainty would surely pervade the whole 
range of government  financial aid  ... and it would apply not alone 
to discrimination but inevitably to all other constitutional safeguards.nl5 
Finally,  petitioners re-stated the position they had maintained 
throughout the controversy with regard to the constitutionality of the 
Hill-Burton Act.    The hospitals claimed no right to discriminate under 
this law—discrimination was their right as private institutions.    Since 
the plaintiffs * rights had not been violated as a result of the law, but 
by private institutions,  the question of constitutionality was irrelevant. 
Even if the constitutionality of the Hill-Burton Act were properly before 
the Court,  the petitioners added, it should not be a foregone conclusion 
that it was invalid.1^    They noted that the Assistant Attorney General 
had stated that the  government could give away money and leave the 
recipient free to discriminate or not discriminatei' and added,  "... the 
only complaint against the waiver provisions is that they do not affirm- 
atively require an otherwise private institution to desegregate, but 
merely leave its privacy intact.    It is difficult to believe—particularly 
in the light of the concession by the Attorney General—that this is 
unconstitutional;  .  . ••*■ 
iSlbid., pp. 8-9. 
•^There had been no previous attempt to defend the constitutionality 
of the "separate but equal" provision of the Hill-Burton Act. 
^Burke Marshall et al., "Brief for Appellant,  United States of 
America in the United StateT"Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
G. C.  Simkins,  Jr.,  et al.,  and United States of America, Appellants, y. 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital,  a Corporation et  al.. Appellees, On   Appeal 
from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North 
Carolina,"   (Washington*    U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 39. 
Hereafter cited as "Brief for United Statesi    Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals." 
l8Roth and Brooks,  "In the Supreme Court:    Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari," p. 17» 
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The Department of Justice also submitted a brief to the Supreme 
Court.    Archibald Cox,  Solicitor General,  and Burke Marshall,  Assistant 
Attorney General, held that the decision of the Apweals Court was 
correct in Doth of its aspects.    It was not solely because the hospitals 
received federal funds that they were being held subject to constitutional 
restraints.    The hospitals were performing a function of the state—a 
function that  the state had assumed through its participation in the 
Hill-Burton program.    There were many elements of government  involve- 
ment with the hospitals in this case, they argued.1? 
With regard to the constitutionality of the Hill-Burton Act,  the 
Department of Justice reasoned* 
If the discrimination is constitutionally impermissible,  the 
statute which authorized both federal and state  governments 
to sanction and participate in such discrimination is,  to 
that extent,  invalid.    Had the court of appeals decided this 
case against petitioners without passing upon the validity 
of the Hill-3urton proviso it would,  in effect,  have required 
petitioners to cease engaging in activities which are validated 
by federal law.20 
On March 2, 196U, the United States Supreme Court denied the petition 
for a writ of certiorari to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.21 The 
19Archibald Cox et al., "Memorandum for the United States:    In the 
Supreme Court of the United States,  October Term,  1963,  »ses H. Cone 
?*roorial Hospital et al.,  Petitioners, v. G. C. Simkinset al. and United 
States of America,  On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,"  (Washington»    U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1S"6U),  p. U.    Hereafter cited as -In the 
Supreme Courts    Memorandum for the United States. 
2%bid.,  p. 5. 
21Simkins v. Cone Hospital,  376 U. S. 938 (196U). 
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Circuit Court's decision was thus,  in effect,  affirmed,  and an order 
enjoining the defendant hospitals from discriminating on the basis of 
race was entered April 16, 1°6U, by Judge Stanley in the District Court 
for the Middle District of North Carolina. 
63 
CHAPTER V 
STATS ACTION 
There ie no precise formula for recognition of state responsibil- 
ity under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.1   When a state through legislative or judicial action directly 
interferes with the constitutional rights 0f individuals,  the applica- 
bility of the Fourteenth Amendment is easily established.    When a seemingly 
private institution abridges individual ri-hts, however, state action 
is not so easily found.    In 1883 the Supreme Court held in the Civil 
Rights Cases that private conduct was not within the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.    Since that "tir.io>  however, the  courts have increas- 
ingly found the Fourteenth A-nendffent to apply in cases where neither 
state law nor state court decision nas involved.    Where does the line 
between private conduct and state action fall? 
iThe Fifth Amendment applies only to action of the federal govern- 
ment and the Fourteenth Amendment to action of state governments.    Although 
the Court in Simkins invoked both the fifth and fourteenth amendments 
to find "state action" in the broad sense  (including federal action), the 
concept of what  constitutes state action has  been developed primarily 
through the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fifth Amendment.    For 
this reason,  it is with the Fourteenth Amendment that this chapter is 
concerned,  although the tests for finding state action which have developed 
are applicable to the federal as «*ll as the state government. 
An informative discussion of th»    problems  involved in invoking 
the Fourteenth Amendment may be t*W £ *****+£*- * £5 °L 
Requirement* Under the Fourteenth Amendment,- The Race Relations Law 
Reporter, I  (1956), 613-637. 
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Before the Simkins decision,  the courts had adopted several tests 
to determine the line between private and sta-te action and had established 
several categories of private institutions whose actions were subject to 
the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.^    in the Simkins case,  the 
courts were urged to accept five different theories of state action as 
the basis  on which to make a decision.    The final choice in this matter 
considerably altered the legal definitions of private conduct and state 
action. 
The Control Test 
Because the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to private actions, 
a logical approach to the problem in Simkins might be to determine whether 
the hospitals were public or private institutions in the constitutional 
sense.    This was the option accepted by Judge Stanley when he said that 
in order to determine the existence of state action "... it is necessary 
2ln addition to those activities which could clearly be called 
state action,  The Race Relations Law Reporter, I, 613-637, suggested 
several types SI private action which might,  under certain circumstances, 
fulfill the requirements for state action.    State action might include 
private action resulting from a mandatory state statute, action of 
lessees from the state, action of private organizations receiving state 
aid,  and action of a private organization performing a function of the 
'°* A more detailed discussion Of the categories of private action 
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment is found in ifoot Court Board of 
Stanford University School of Law, "Bench temorandum f or St anf ordMoat 
Court Sitting as tne Supreme Court of the United States  in the Case°f „ 
Moses H. Cont Memorial Hospital, Appellant v. 0. C. Sxmkins, ^-Appellee, 
prepared for use in the Twelfth Annual Kanon Rice Kirkwood Competition, 
February \, 1961* (mimeographed,  1961*),  pp. 1-8.    The bench memorandum 
nhich is involved with government to a significant extent. 
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to examine the various aspects of governmental involvement which the 
plaintiffs contend add up to make the defendant hospitals public 
corjwrations in the constitutional sense.»3   He agreed with the defendants 
that the decisive factor in such a determination was government control. 
This test for distinguishing between public and private insti- 
tutions was stated as early as 181? when Justice Story, concurring in 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. (U Wheat.) 5l8  (181?) wrote* 
When the corporation is said,  at the bar,  to be public it 
is not merely meant that the whole  community may be the 
proper objects of its bounty,  but that the government have 
the sole right,  as trustees of the public interest, to 
regulate,  control and direct the corporation,  and its funds 
and its franchises, at its own good will and pleasure. 
Since that time the courts have used the same test a number of times to 
determine the existence of state action in Fourteenth Amendment cases* 
In Norris v.  jjaw and City Council,  the court upheld an art school's 
denial of admission to a Negro applicant saying "The legal test between 
a private and public corporation is whether the corporation is subject 
to control by public authority, state or ■■litljlil     '    The court applied 
the control test in Williams v. Howard Johnson's Kestaurant to find that 
restaurant free of constitutional restraints and ruled that the restaurant 
licensing law ■  .  .   .  is designed to protect the health of the community 
but it does not authorize state officials to control the management of 
the business or to dictate what persons shall be served •■*    And in the 
3simkins v. Cone Hospital,  211 F.  Supp. 628  (M.D.N.C. 1962) 
**78 F.  Supp. 151  (DJM. MW)* 
^268 F. 2d 8U5 (Ijth Cir. 1°5°). 
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case of Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Manorial Hospital, 
the court decided the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to Walker 
Hospital because "... the hospital was not an instrumentality of 
the State but a corporation managed and operated by an independent 
board free from State control."0 
When they argued before the Circuit Court, the plaintiffs partially 
accepted the view of the defendants and the loner court with regard to 
control.    They submitted seven categories of federal and state controls 
over the hospitals*    construction contracts, details of hospital con- 
struction and equipment,  future operation and status of hospitals, details 
of hospital maintenance and operation,  size and distribution of facilities, 
rights of project applicants and state agencies, and racial discrimination. 
Most of these controls,  however, did not really touch the actual 
management of the hospitals.    The construction requirements have nothing 
to do with the operation of the hospital and may be considered necessary 
conditions of the grant to prevent wasting money on buildings or equip- 
ment that might collapse in a few years.    Since Congress  could not make 
unlimited appropriations for projects it was necessary to establish some 
plan of priority for the distribution and size of projects.    Neither does 
the right to a fair hearing before the state agency of a dissatisfied 
626l F. 2d 521 (Uth Cir. 1958). 
7jack Greenberg et al., "In the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, G. C^STmki**,  Jr., et al., £«f^«**»* 
America, Appellants v. Moses H. Cone Memorial H^*1'  • ^J^l 
et al., Appellees, On Appeal from the United States District «•»*»*» 
the MiddlS District of North Carolina,    Brief of Appellants G. C. Simkins, 
Jr., et al.,"  (New Yorki   Allied Printing, 1963), PP. 12-18.    Hereafter 
cited as "Brief of G. C. Simkins." 
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project applicant, nor the right of a state agency to a review of the 
Surgeon General 'a decision by the federal courts affect the management 
of a hospital receiving Hill-Burton funds. 
Several of the regulations listed could be considered controls 
over management of the hospitals.    If a hospital were sold to anyone 
not qualified to file an application under the Hill-Burton Act, or if 
it ceased to be  nonprofit within twenty years after the completion of 
a project, the federal government could recover a share of its grant to 
that hospital.    The hospitals were also required to submit proposed 
budgets to assure their ability to pay the prevailing rates of wages 
and to maintain and operate the hospital for a two-year period after 
completion of a project.    The states participating in the Hill-Burton 
program were required to enact laws which established state standards 
for operation and maintenance of hospitals and, in accordance, North 
Carolina passed a hospital licensing law in 19U7.    In order to be licensed 
to operate,  a hospital must meet the minimum requirements set forth by 
the state law. 
Finally,  government regulation of racial discrimination might be 
considered a control over the hospitals' day-to-day operation.    If a 
hospital chose to be a nondiscriminatory facility, control could be 
exerted by the government over the admissions policies of that hospital. 
If, however, a hospital chose to be a -separate but equal- institution, 
there would be no government regulation of its admission policies. Tnue, 
in the case of Con. and Long, both -separate but equal- institutions, 
68 
this could not  be considered a  control over their policies. 
Even in the  case of these regulations which did affect the hospitals' 
actual operation,  however,  it could not be said that government had 
"...  the sole  right   ...  to regulate,  control and direct the corpo- 
ration, and its funds and its franchises,  at its own good will and pleasure." 
On the basis of the control test,  at least applied in its strictest sense, 
the hospitals could only be declared private institutions. 
The judiciary, however, was not bound by this approach.    Although 
semantic differences often seem unimportant,  the defendants erred when 
they said* 
The plaintiffs still suggest in this Court that our question 
is "Whether the appellees'  contacts with government are 
sufficient to place them under the  restraints of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments against racial discrimination.■ 
This may seem to   the plaintiffs a more euphemistic inquiry 
than whether the defendant hospitals are "public corporations" 
or even "public corporations in the constitutional sense"— 
but no amount of euphemism can conceal the ultimate spade. 
It is  the same question still— ..." 
It was not the same question still*    although the control test was the 
established one for determining whether a corporation was public or private, 
it was not the only test available for finding state action. 
^Whether this provision is constitutional is not at issue here,  only 
whether this provision grants the government some control over the hospital.. 
That this was not a control in this case is exemplified by the fact that 
Cone, a "separate  but equal" hospital, did in fact admit Negroes. 
Herbert S. Falk and Charles E. Roth, "In the United State. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,  G. C.  Si-kins, Jr.,  et al., and United 
State,  of America, Appellants v. Moses H. Cone "j^* ^f*1*1'  * ~rp°- 
ration,  et al.,  Appellee.,    Brief and Appendix of ***+**+!**? 
the Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and Harold Bettis,  its Director," 
(1963),  p. 5-6.    Hereafter cited as "Brief of Cone Hospital." 
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Affection With A Public Interest 
An alternative to the control theory is the theory that insti- 
tutions which are  of a public nature, which affect the community at 
large and operate  for the benefit of the general public, are subject 
to Fourteenth Amendment requirements.    Although hospitals certainly 
fall into this category, merely being operated for the benefit of the 
public is not sufficient to place an institution under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.     The  courts have utilized this test  for finding state action 
only when other conditions,  such as a government lease or franchise, 
were present,10 
Burke Marshall,  the Assistant Attorney General,  submitted a 
brief argument in this vein in the District Court.11   He began by 
asserting that a hospital is decidedly an institution of a public 
nature and that "Courts have long recognized that restrictions properly 
could be placed on activities affected with a public interest, 
cited Munn v. Illinois,  Nebbia v. New York,  Marsh v. Alabama,  and 
-12 He 
iOln Boman v. Birmingham Transit Company,  230 F. 2d 531  (5th Cir. 
1960), state"icTIon was found on the basis ol' affection with a public 
interest and a government franchise.    In Derrington v. Flummer,  2U0 
F. 2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cart, denied. 353 U.S. 92liTT957T; a facility 
which was affected with a public interest and f located *»g2f*J 
which it leased from the county government was held to be involved in 
state action. 
lime major portion of the Department of J^tice-s argument was 
not based on the -affection with a public interest- theory, but on the 
"totality of government involvement- theory. 
"Marshall et al., -Bfemorandum of the United States,    In the 
United States District Court,- p. 31. 
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Bogag v. Birmingham Transit Company to support this statement,!3    The 
argument was  concluded by reference to Justice Douglas'  concurring 
opinion in Garner v. Louisiana,  in which he stated that such restric- 
tions  (constitutional prohibitions against state governments) apply- 
to retail establishments which operate under a permit from the munic- 
ipal government. 
Although Marshall did not develop his argument to the point of 
applying it  to the hospitals in the Simkins case, Douglas' reasoning 
was clearly applicable to the defendant hospitals.    In Douglas'  view, 
licensure by government was the "something more11  (comparable to a 
franchise or lease) iciich in conjunction with "affection with a public 
interest" was sufficient to find state action.    In his concurring 
opinion he stated* 
The authority to license a business for public use  is 
derived from the public.    Negroes are as much a part of 
that public as are whites.    A municipality granting a 
license to operate a business for the public represents 
^he Assistant Attorney General seemed to be saying that  restric- 
tions, be they constitutional restrictions or an exercise of a state's 
police power,   can be placed on facilities affected with a public interest. 
He dealt, however, with the two different types of restrictions as if 
they were one.    In both "unn v. Illinois, 9U U.  S. 113 (1377) and Nebbia 
v. New York,  291 U. S. 507T193U), the Court upheld state social legis- 
lation—regulations on private entities—because the institutions were 
affected with a public interest.    In no case that concerned constitutional 
limitations,   however,  was state action found solely on the basis of 
affection with a public interest.    In Marsh v. Alabama,  326 U.S. 501 
(19U6),  there was more involved than affection with a public Merest. 
In that case, a corporation which owned and governed a town was held to 
be violating First Amendment freedoms by refusing to permit the distri- 
bution of religious literature in that town.    The state had permitted 
the company to assume a state function (governing a community)  and had 
prosecuted under an anti-trespass statute the Jehovah's Witness that 
was attempting to distribute the literature.    In 3oman v. Birmingham Transit 
Company,  280 F. 2d 531  (5th Cir. I960), state actloJTwas found not only 
b^SSe the  facility was affected with a public interest, but also because 
it was franchised by the state. 
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Negroes as well as all other races who live there.    A 
license to establish a restaurant is a license to establish 
a public facility and necessarily imports,  in law, equality 
of use for all members of the public.    I see no way whereby 
licenses issued by a State to serve the public can be 
distinguished from leases of public facilities  .   .   . for 
that end.lU 
Thus,  were this reasoning accepted, the licenses under which Cone 
and Long hospitals operated would be the additional factor necessary to 
halt their policy of racial discrimination. 
This  concept of state action was discussed as a possible source 
of congressional power to pass the Civil Rights Act of 196U, but there 
were   (and are) many problems  inherent in the theory that  institutions 
licensed by the state are subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.    They 
are perhaps best summarized in this state-sent» 
It was soon discovered that this theory would catch many 
inedible fish and let many big ones get away—for example, 
it would reach fortune tellers and embalraers in many states, 
but  not department stores or hotels in some states j  it would 
create virtually insoluble difficulties with lawyers,  doctors, 
motor vehicle operators, cJid others, not only under the 
equal protection clause but under other constitutional in- 
hibitions; and it was immediately obvious that any State 
willing to give up its licensing program might substantially 
defeat "legislation based on this theory of State action.** 
A decision,  therefore,  based in part on state licensure of an institution 
might not only be easily circumvented but it might also give rise to a 
number of problems. 
% arner v . state of Louisiana, 368 U. S. 175 (1961). 
I5charles E. Roth, -Federal Legislative if*>rity,»« HTrStlr 
at the Institute on Practical Problens and Recent Developments in Consti- 
tutional Law of the North Carolina Bar Association, MMM****»»• 
University of North Carolina,  and Wake Forest College,  February 12 and 13, 
1965 (mineographed), p. v-11. 
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An Essential Function of the State 
A third approach to the problem in Simkins is based on the theory 
that when a private institution performs an essential state  function or 
responsibility,  it must coraply with constitutional requirements Just as 
would the state, had it performed the function.    On several occasions 
the courts have utilized this theory to find state action.    The Supreme 
Court ruled in Smith v. Allwright that the denial to a Negro of the 
right to vote in a primary held by the Democratic party in Texas was 
unconstitutional.    The primary was a vital part of the election machinery 
of the state and, therefore, Texas had delegated a state  function to 
the party by allowing it to determine qualified voters  in the primaries.16 
The Terrv v» Adams decision declared unconstitutional the exclusion of 
Negroes from the "private primaries" of the Jaybird party  (an unofficial 
party whose nominees met  no opposition in the Democratic primaries).    The 
private political club played a vital role in the state's elections—it 
performed a  function of the state—and its actions were subject to the 
Fifteenth Amendment in the same manner as were the state's actions. 
The area of voting rights is not the only one where private insti- 
tutions or persons had assumed a duty of the state and been brought under 
the Constitution. The refusal of a private company-owned town to allow 
the distribution of religious literature within its premises was declared 
a violation of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment. In Marsh v. 
Alabama, the Court said that the fact that the property where the depri- 
vation of liberty took place was privately owned was "... not sufficient 
l6321 U. S. 6U9 (19UU). 
!73U5 U. S. U61 (1953). 
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to justify the State'3 permitting a corporation to govern a community 
of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the en- 
forcement of such restraint by application of a State statute."18    The 
corporation had been delegated a state function and it therefore had 
the same responsibilities as the state with regard to that function. 
It nas this line of reasoning that the Department of Justice 
advocated in the Circuit Court.    The applicability of the "essential 
function of the state" theory to the Simkins case had occurred to the 
Assistant Attorney General earlier, and he touched upon the subject in 
his argument  in the District Court sayingI 
Both governmental and non-profit hospitals serve as general 
community hospitals.    Such "community hospitals have become 
essential,  both to provide hospital service to the people 
of the community and to enable its physicians to practice 
good medicine."    Hence non-profit hospitals perform a vital 
function which would otherwise have to be performed by the 
state.    It is not, therefore, inappropriate to include such 
hospitals within the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Only recently a court suggested that schools and colleges, 
"no matter how  'private1 they may claim to be," are so 
affected with the public interest as to be bound by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.19 
The decision to itoich Marshall referred was Guillory v. Administrators of 
Tulane University,  in which the court saidi 
No one any longer doubts that education is a matter affected 
with the public interest.    And this is true whether it is 
offered by a public or private institution.   ...    Clearly, 
the administrators of a private college are performing a 
public function.    They do the work of the state,  often in the 
place of the state.    Does it not follow that they stand in the 
state's shoes?    And,  if so, are they not then agents of the state, 
subject to the constitutional restraints on governmental action,   . 
18326 U. S. 501 (19U6). 
^Marshall et al.. "Memorandum of the United States:    In the United 
States District Court," p. 33* 
20Quoted by Marshall, Ibid.,  p. 3k. 
20 
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Marshall did not mention, however, that the court did not base its 
decision on this reasoning,  nor that the decision was subsequently 
overruled. 
The major problem with such an approach in the Simkins  case 
would seem to be the establishment of the fact that the provision of 
hospital facilities was an essential state function.    As Judge Haynsworth 
pointed out in his dissenting opinionj 
.   .   . the statutes do not empower the Medical Care Commission 
to provide general hospital facilities in a locality in 
default of cooperative efforts by local governmental bodies 
or citizens for the provision of such f-cilities.    The role 
of the Commission is strictly limited, as  is the role of 
the United States,  to providing grants in aid of local 
effort,  and the Commission is empowered to do nothing in 
the absence of such local effort.'" 
It appeared that by participating in the Hill-Burton program a etate did 
not assume an obligation to provide hospitals for the people of the state. 
21pistrict Judge Wright held on March 28, 1962,  that Tulane Uni- 
versity could  not discriminate against Negroes because  the history of 
the school and an analysis of its state connections indicated to him 
that it was a state institution,  not because it was a private school 
performing a function of the state.    He granted the plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment.    Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 
203 F.  Supp.  855 (E.D.La. 15*2).    The defendants filed motions for a 
new trial and a rehearing.    In the rehearing on 'fay 15,  1962, the court 
decided that there was still an issue of material fact in the case.    The 
judgment of the court had been premised on the fact that Tulane was 
historically and legally a state school, a fact winch was challenged. 
Only where there is no genuine issue as to any fact may a•<■■"■? 
judgment be granted,  thus the case was set for trial on ^ ^its. 
Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University,  207 F.  Supp. 556  (E.D.La 
T^oTTT^On December 5, BSE  it was decided that "There is insufficient 
s^Se^lvSnflZthe1 operation of the Tulane to***»^ *£*£»• 
to bring it within the privileges and proscriptions of the fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.-    Guillory. v. Administrators 
of Tulane University,  212 F. Supp. 67U (E.D.U. 1962). 
22Simkins v. Cone Hospital, 323 F. 2d 959  (Uth Cir. 1963). 
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Marshall avoided the obvious difficulties of proving that the 
actual provision of hospitals was a state duty by arguing that the 
function of the state was to plan for hospitals.    The Department of 
Justice's argument  begant 
Our position is based on the  fact that the Hill-Burton 
system contemplates a State obligation to plan for 
facilities to provide adequate hospital service to all 
the people of the State.    To the extent that this ob- 
ligation is carried out by otherwise private institutions, 
these recipients of the federal grants are acting for 
the  State and are therefore  subject,  in this respect, 
to the obligations imposed upon State agents and instru- 
mentalities by the Fourteenth Amendment.23 
In his argument,  Marshall relied heavily on congressional intent 
in enacting the Hill-Burton Act and the requirement of a state plan by 
that law.    "It was Congress* intention,1* he argued,  "that the partic- 
ipating States plan for facilities to provide adequate hospital service 
to  'all the people»  of the State  .  .  .   ."2l*    The law required each 
state wishing to benefit  from Hill-Burton funds to design a state plan 
for the provision of hospital facilities.    The obligation was the state's, 
he stressed,   "... and if, for example,  the number of beds in non- 
profit hospitals appear to be inadequate to meet the needs,  the State 
would undoubtedly have to plan for beds  in governmental institutions to 
have a program meeting the requirements of the law."2'    "Accordingly," 
he reasoned,  "when the State draws a non-State institution into the 
23Marshall et al., "Brief for United States t   Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals,"  pp. lb-19. 
2klbid.,  p. 20. 
25ibid. 
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State plan,  the latter performs one of the State's acknowledged 
functions."2" 
There ire re problems even with this view.    The state allowances, 
or nrequirementsn as Marshall called them,  were set forth in the Code 
of Federal Regulations.    The number of beds considered necesssry to 
provide adequate service were:    for states having 12 or more people 
per square mile, U.5 general hospital beds per thousand population; for 
states with a population under 12 and over 6 persons per square mile, 
5 beds per thousand} and for states with fewer than 6 persons per square 
mile,  5.5 beds per thousand.27    These, however, were not requirements 
that the state was obligated to meet, but  goals.    Indeed,  they were 
actually allowances,   for once an area was brought up to the standard 
considered adequate,  no further Hill-Burton aid could be received in 
that area.28    Further evidence that states did not have to plan for 
26lbid. 
27u.  s#, Code of Federal Regulations,  Title U2,  par. 53.11. 
^The plaintiffs presented a new angle of the "essential function- 
theory by alleging that if North Carolina had decided to build public 
hostels in £ freensboro area, Long and Cone l£l M» *«?*1£ 
federal aid    and.  on the other hand, the aid granted Cone and Long hos- 
?iSf pSSlbS'tS construction (with the aid of Hill-Burton funds)^ 
of public hospitals,  since the standards set up by the Code ^g*gS 
Regulations had been met in that area.    Thus,  they reasonedtn.t tne 
hospitals had «... become the  chosen and exclusive ^™e£80™c# 
carry out governmental objectives."   J^J"U$^J2^°fhr    * 
Sag 6A£SSSS EStliS government aid, there would still be no nxxx °^ 
for the development of public hospitals in that area. 
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additional beds in public institutions if the ones in private hospitals 
were not adequate to have a program meeting the "requirements" of the 
law is supplied by North Carolina's participation in the Hill-Burton 
program.    North Carolina had been involved in the Hill-Burton program 
since 191*7 and, as of 1961, it had not reached the goal specified in 
the Code of Federal Regulations.    For a stai.e with over 12 persons per 
square mile,  U.5 hospital beds were considered necessary per thousand 
people.2?    In 19ll7,  North Carolina had 2.5 hospital beds per thousand, 
and, in 1961, it had 3.7 beds per thousand people.3°    ihis clearly 
indicates that,  although the goals had been attained in some areas,  in 
other areas they had not,  and the state had not assumed the responsibility 
of providing or planning for the additional beds necessary to reach 
these goals. 
Were hospitals which received Hill-Burton money found to be per- 
forming a state function,  it would be difficult to make a distinction 
between those hospitals receiving such funds and those which did not. 
All would be assuming a duty of the state, regardless of government aid. 
In states receiving aid from the federal government,  the capacity of 
every hospital in the state was taken into account in the state plan. 
Whether the expansion of these hospitals had been accomplished with or 
without Hill-Burton funds,  it would have affected the state plan in 
precisely the same way.    If,  as the Assistant Attorney General argued, 
29In I960 there were 92.9 persons per square mile in North Carolina, 
30North Carolina Medical Care Commission, Report for the Biennivm 
1959-1961 and Summary of Activities, July 1. 19U5-June 30,  Igg  OBBIpl 
North Carolina Medical Care Commission, 1961), p. 16. 
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"the number of beds in non-profit hospitals appears to be inadequate 
to meet the needs, the State would undoubtedly have to plan for beds 
in governmental institutions  .   .   .  .» any hospital, whether it had 
received aid or not, would be  relieving the state of a burden.    As the 
attorneys for Cone Hospital pointed out, "... a private hospital 
which does not receive any financial aid at all from the government is 
shouldering the assumed burden  'pro even more tanto'—so that under this 
reasoning, the more private it is,  the more public it would become»*3* 
If a distinction were to be made between hospitals receiving Hill- 
Burton aid and those not receiving it,  it would have to be made only on 
the basis of the aid itself,  but  the Justice Department made no such 
claim.    In fact,  Marshall stated*    "Nor do we urge that the receipt of 
government financial aid is sufficient, without more,  to deprive an 
otherwise private institution of its non-governmental character."32 
Despite the  obvious difficulties presented by this theory,  it 
is not one  io be discounted.    Although Judge Sobeloff did not base 
his decision on this reasoning,  he called the Assistant Attorney General's 
argument "worthy of note" and went on to quote part of it* 
"Upon joining the program a participating State  in effect 
assumes,  as a State function, the obligation of planning 
for adequate hospital care.    And it is, of course,  clear 
that when a State function or responsibility is being 
exercised,  it matters not for Fourteenth Amendment purposes 
that the * * * /Institution actually chosen/ would other- 
wise be private I    the equal protection guarantee applies."^ 
3lFalk and Roth,  "Brief of Cone Hospital," p.  23. 
32Marshall et al.,  "Brief for United States:    Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals," p. 19. 
33Quoted in Simkins T. Cone Hospital, 323 F. 2d 959  (Uth Cir. 1963). 
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State Action in State Non-Action 
A fourth method for the determination of state action in Simkins 
was suggested by the attorneys for the American Civil Liberties Union, 
who submitted a brief in the Circuit Court as amicus curias.^    Their 
position was that the principle of Worth Carolina law—action by the 
state—which denied the plaintiffs in this case a cause of action for 
damages or injunctive relief against the hospitals wa3 unconstitutional. 
Although there was no North Carolina statute or judicial decision con- 
cerning discrimination against  Negro doctors and patients by private 
hospitals,  decisions in similar areas indicated that the plaintiffs did 
not have a cause of action against the hospitals, and to support this 
argument they quoted a decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court in 
State v. Avent. 35 
No statute of North Carolina requires the exclusion of 
Negroes and of White people in company with Negroes from 
restaurants,  ani no statute in this State forbids dis- 
crimination by the owner of a restaurant of people on 
account of race or color ....    In the absence of a 
3%ule 29,  Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that 
a written brief of an amicus  curiae may oe filed only if it U accompanied 
by written consent of all parties or by permission of the court.    Only 
under extraordinary circumstances will an amicus curiae be allowed to 
participate in the oral argument.    The United States occasionally appears 
as amicus curiae  in a case,  and in its case, no consent of parties or 
peraission of the  court is required.    More often,  however,  the United 
States  intervenes as a party in litigation betweenJ^*»*««'  " 
it did in the Simkins case.    Whenever the "^^S^jf "**** 
of the United Stated is drawn into question, the United States has a 
statutory right to intervene with all the rights of a party in the 
controversy. 
35state v. Avent, 253 No. Car. 580, 118 S.E. 2d 1*7 (1961).    This 
case was f^lld SFfe United States Supreme Court £e re  it was sanded 
to the  North Carolina Supreme Court in light of Peterson v. Greenville. 
State v. Avent,  373 U. S. 375  (1962). 
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Statute forbidding discrimination based on race or color 
in restaurants, the rule is well established that an 
operator of a privately owned restaurant nrivately oper- 
ated in a privately owned building has the right to 
select the clientele he will serve  .  .  .   .3° 
Other "orivate" enterprises,  including hospitals, the American Civil 
Liberties Union attorneys added,  were generally held to be free to 
select  their clientele on any oasis.^ 
The issue,  as the American Civil Liberties Union saw it, was 
Whether this principle of North Carolina law violated the due  process 
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.    It did, they 
reasoned,  because "The only constitutional principle of North Carolina 
law there can be denoting legal relationships between these patients 
and doctors and the hospitals would be a principle forbidding the 
hospitals to utilize race as a standard for access to the benefits of 
the hospitals."38    Thus,  they concluded! 
The hospitals' motion to dismiss, based, as it must be 
on a principle  of North Carolina law that they are per- 
mitted to discriminate,  should not have been granted, 
for it is unconstituti ,nal for North Carolina to fail 
to give plaintiffs the legal right to be free of racial 
discrimination on the facts of this case.    It would be 
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment for a North 
Carolina State court to dismiss the plaintiffs'  complaint, 
36Quoted by Marion A. fright and John H. feeler,  "In ^-United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, %%«««£»*., et al" 
and United States of America, Appellants v. ^oses H. Cone*J"**J 
Hospital,  a Corporation, et al.,  Appellees,  On Jffi^^Lg?**!^ 
States District Court for the riddle District of ,ortn Carolina,    Brief 
of the American Civil Liberties Union as Anicus Curiae,"    New York* 
nllT^ess,  &£>.  P. H.    Hereafter cited as "Brief of American Civil 
Liberties Union." 
37ibid., p. 10. 
38lbid., p. 11. 
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if this  case were in a State court.    The District Court 
should not,  therefore,  have dismissed the complaint,  for 
that dismissal gave effect to an unconstitutional prin- 
ciple of State law. 39 
In other words, this rather novel position was that it was unconsti- 
tutional for a state not to make discrimination by private persons 
illegal.    The absence of positive action on the part of the state 
should be considered "state action" for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees. 
There are some legal theorists who feel that the Fourteenth 
Amendment imposes upon the state a duty to eli.dnate racial discrimi- 
nation in "private" areas.    One view is that in the Civil Rights Cases 
of 1383  (109 U. S. 3) the Supreme Court frustrated the intention of 
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide the federal govern- 
ment with power over private violation of civil rights.    The Court 
misconstrued the language of the amendment and established the concept 
of positive  state action which rendered Congress powerless in the face 
of state non-action.    Justice Bradley said in the Civil Right3 Cases 
that the Fourteenth Amendment "... nullifies and makes void all 
state legislation and state action of every kind which impairs  .  .  . 
privileges and immunities,  injures  .  .  . without due process of law, 
or which denies  .   .   . equal protection .  ..." If this were what the 
framers had meant,  one theorist,  Professor R. P. Peters,  pointed out, 
the amendment would have read "No state shall make or enforce any   law 
which shall abridge  .  .   .   , deprive  .  .  . ,  or deny .  .   .  ."        Peters 
39ibid., p. 11. 
k°Roger Paul Peters,  "Civil Rights and State Non-Action," Notre 
Dame Lawyer,  XXXIV (May,  1959), 320. 
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continued* 
Bub this they did not do.    What they did do was (1) prohibit 
the state from abridging the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States designating with positive 
language  (•  .   .  . make or enforce  .  .  .*)  the method by 
which abridgment must occur in order to fall within the 
prohibition;  (2) prohibit the state from depriving any person 
of life, liberty,  and property without due process of law, 
saying nothing about the method by which deprivation must 
occur  .   .  .}  (3) prohibit the state from denying any person 
the equal protection of the laws,  again without designating 
how the prohibited denial must  come about»S* 
The state could deny equal protection and due process in ways other than 
making or enforcing a law—by not making or enforcing a law when under 
duty to do so,  he concluded.    Since 1883, however, the theory that state 
non-action was sufficient to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment has not 
received the weight of judicial support.**** 
^Ibid. 
^peters discusses decisions which indicate that there was some 
judicial acceptance of his view of the Fourteenth Amendment prior to 
I883.    In United States v. Given,  25 Fed. Cas. 132U (C.CD.Del. 1873), a 
case    involving the refusal by state official to collect poll taxes from 
Negroes,  the  court said,  "Undoubtedly, an act or an omission to act may 
be an offense both against the state law and the laws of the United States. 
Any other doctrine would place the national government entirely within the 
power of the  state and would leave constitutional rights guarded only by 
the protection which each state might choose to extend to them." Ibid., 
quoted at p.  32$.    United States v. Hall,  26 Fed. Cas.  19  (CCS.CAla. 1871), 
involved the violation of the "cTvil Eights Act of 1870 by private individuals 
who banded together with intent to interfere with the right of freedom of 
speech and peaceful assembly of others.    Peters quotes the decision m this 
case alsoi    "Denying includes inaction as well as action, and denying the 
equal protection of the laws includes the omission to protect, as well as 
the omission to pass laws for protection." Ibid., at p. 327.    Thus,  the 
court upheld this  section of the law because"^ ruled that Congress had the 
power to protect the rights of citizens against unfriendly and insufficient 
state legislation.    Peters claims that there has been judicial support of 
his theory since 1883 and gives the examples of Picking v. Pennsylvania R. R., 
151 F. 2d 2it0 (3rd Cir. 15>U5), and lynch v. United-ptes, 10? F. 2d UYO 
(5th Cir. 1951).    Like the Given caieThowever, both oT^these cases in- 
volved incorrect enforcemen^cr-failure on the part of a state official to 
enforce a state law.    While the courts have held improper enforcement of a 
law to be state action, they have not included in that definition of state 
action tne failure of a state to    positively guarantee Fourteenth Amend- 
ment rights against private violation. 
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In view of the 1883 Civil Rights Cases, the dismissal of the 
plaintiffs'  complaint by a state court would not necessarily, as the 
American Civil Liberties Union alleged,  be violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.    Although state courts cannot put their weight behind racial 
discrimination by enforcing private agreements which abridge the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to Negroes  (Shelley v. Kraemer,  33U 
U. S. 1 2*£fcw)»  *■ the absence of such an agreement which depended 
on the court for enforcement,  that court could only apply the reasoning 
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to actions solely private 
in character.    Nor did the District Court's decision in effect uphold 
an unconstitutional principle  of North Carolina law, because it was 
not this principle  of law that the defendants relied on as a basis for 
their motion to dismiss the complaint,  but, rather,  the standard inter- 
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment—that the prohibitions are against 
the state,  not private persons. 
The attorneys for Cone Hospital dismissed the argument by saying 1 
Discrimination by private persons is not itself violative 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.    It is therefore difficult to 
credit as a serious one the suggestion that the mere 
omission of the State to make illegal this permissible 
conduct is violative of the same Fourteenth Amendment— 
that all under the one amendment the state commits a crime 
in failing to make a crime of that which is admittedly 
not a crime #W 
And apparently the court in Simkins was not willing to give this view 
serious attention either, for it made no mention of the American Civil 
Liberties Union's brief. 
^alk and Roth,  "Brief of Cone Hospital," p. 32. 
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Totality of Government InvolvenBnt 
A fifth applicable test is whether the state has become so 
involved in private  conduct that it might be considered action of the 
state for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.    This theory, that 
each government  involvement with the hospitals,  although insufficient 
individually to bring the  hospitals under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
should count cumulatively on the scale for determining state action, 
was submitted by the  plaintiffs.    Although the Circuit Court counted as 
significant only those  contacts arising as a result of the Hill-Burton 
Act and discounted the other involvements presented by the plaintiffs, 
it did base its decision on this reasoning.^ 
Judge Haynsworth,  dissenting,  called the Simkins decision "un- 
precedented »n    Chief Judge Sobeloff held that "... this case is 
controlled by Burton,   .   .   «"U5    Had the Supreme Court  in Burton ▼• 
Wilmington Parking Authority accepted the "totality of government in- 
volvement" test,  or had Simkins written this new concept of state action 
into constitutional law? 
The Burton case concerned the refusal of service to a Negro by 
the Eagle Coffee Choppe, a private restaurant located in a city-owned 
automobile parking building in Wilmington, Delaware.    The owner of the 
^Plaintiffs had urged consideration of a number of involvements 
other than those resulting from the Hill-Burton program:    state licensing 
of the hospitals,  tax-exempt status of the hospitals,  the appointment of 
six trustees of Cone Hospital by public authorities, and the training 
program for student nurses conducted at Cone.    Greenberg et al«, "Brief 
of G. C.  Simkins," pp.  27-29,  33-36. 
U5sijnkins v.  Cone Hospital,  323 F. 2d 959 (iith Cir. 1963). 
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restaurant had leased the property from the Wilmington Parking Authority 
and derived much of his business from patrons of the public parking 
building.    The Court began its decision in this  case by saying, "Only 
by sifting the facts and weighing circumstances  can the nonobvious 
involvement of the state in private conduct be attributed its true 
significance.»U6 
In general, the circumstances neighed by the Court were the 
followingt    the restaurant was located on land and in a building which 
were publicly owned and dedicated to public use; the commercially leased 
area was physic411y and financially an integral,  indispensable part of 
the State's plan to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit; main- 
tenance  (including repairs and heating) of the building was the respon- 
sibility of the Authority and payable out of public funds j the restaurant 
and Parking Authority conferred on each other a variety of mutual benefits; 
and any improvement effected in the leasehold by Eagle would not result 
in increased taxes since the fee was held by a tax-exempt government 
agency; and profits earned by discrimination contributed to the financial 
success of a government agency.    The Court then declareds 
Addition of all these activities, obligations and respon- 
sibilities of the Authority, the benefits mutually conferred, 
together with the obvious fact that the restaurant is 
operated as an integral part of a public building devoted 
to a public parking service, indicates that degree of 
State participation and involvement in discriminatory action 
which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
condemn.u7 
^Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,  365 U. S. 715 (1961)• 
k7lbid. 
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The Court concluded its decision in Burton, however* 
Because readily applicable formulae may not be fashioned, 
the conclusions drawn from the facts and circumstances of 
this record are by no means declared as universal truths 
on the basis of which every State leasing agreement is to 
be tested.   .   .  .    Specifically defining the limits of our 
inquiry,  what we hold today is that when a State leases" 
public property in the manner and for the purpose shown 
to have been the case here,  the proscriptions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment must be  complied with by the lessee 
as certainly as though they were binding covenants written 
into the agreement itself .u8  (Emphasis mine) 
Exactly what principle might be drawn from Burton is uncertain* 
There is some reason to believe,  as Judge Sobeloff did, that the Court 
had broken new ground in the interpretation of state action by basing 
its decision on the "totality of government involvement" theory.    That 
is,  instead of disregarding each connection with government which was 
insufficient in itself to satisfy the requirement of state action, the 
Court assigned some weight to each of these involvements and evaluated 
the  case on the basis of the total weight.    The method employed by the 
Court, that of examining the various connections, and its statement 
that "Addition of all these activities" indicate that  it had subscribed 
to a new theory.    Even the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan (in 
which he was  joined by Justice Whittaker) suggests that Burton was not 
just another "leasing case:" 
The Court «s opinion, by a process of first undiscriaiinat- 
ingly throwing together various factual bits and pieces 
and then undermining the resulting structure by an equally 
vague disclaimer,  seems to me to leave  completely at  sea 
just what  it is in this record that satisfies the require- 
ment of "state action."U° 
**8Ibid. 
k^Ibid. 
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It is perhaps more reasonable to take another view of the case, 
however.    There  is much to indicate that the Burton decision was merely 
another of the well-established leasing cases.5°    Since the various 
connections between the Eagle Coffee Shoppe and government were a result 
of the restaurant's lease with the Wilmington Parking Authority,  it 
would seem that the lease was the  crucial factor.    It was the addition 
of the  activities of the Parking Authority,  the mutual benefits to 
Parking Authority and restaurant by the arrangement, ■  .  .  . together 
with the obvious fact that the restaurant is operated as an integral 
part of a public building devoted to a public parking service  .  .  . •" 
which the Court  found to be significant in the establishment of state 
action,51    Moreover, the Court went on to speak of the case as if it 
^There are many decision in which the courts have concluded that 
discrimination by a private lessee of public property is forbidden by 
the Constitution.    See,  for example, Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical 
Association,  3l*7 U. S. 971  (195k)i Ci^EFof Greensboro v. Simkins,  2U6 
F. 2d U25  (Uth Cir. 1957); Wimbish v. Pinella County Florida, 3k2 F. 2d 
80U (5th Cir. 1965) j Derrington v. Plummer,  21t0 F. 2d 331 [gth Cir. 1956), 
cert, denied,  353 U. S. 92U (1957); Hammond v. University of Tampa,  3UU 
FTTd $51 (5th Cir. 1965); Tate v. Department of Conservation,  23I F. 2d 
615 (Iith Cir. 1956). 
5lThe facts and decision in Burton closely resemble those in 
Derrington v.  Plummer,  21*0 F. 2d 531  (5th Cir. 1956),cert, denied,  353 
U. S. 92k (1957).    Derrington involved discrimination in a privately 
operated cafeteria which was located in the basement of a county court- 
house and which was leased from the county.    The court took into account 
the fact that the courthouse had been built with public funds for the use 
of citizens generally and that the county furnished water, electricity, 
heat and air conditioning to the lessee.    The purpose of the lease was 
to furnish cafeteria service for the benefit of persons who had occasion 
to be  in the courthouse.    If the county had rendered such a service, 
the court held,  its actions would be subject to the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment and the same result follows when the service is rendered through the 
instrumentality of a lessee.    There were the same categories of activities 
as in Burton:    the activities of the courthouse, mutual benefits, and 
the restaurant's being an integral part of a public building devoted to 
public use. 
88 
were essentially a leasing case when it added that its conclusions were 
not to be considered "... universal truths on the basis of which 
every State leasing agreement is to be tested."   Finally, in clarifi- 
cation of the issue, the Court concluded "... what we hold today is 
that when a State leases public property in the manner and for the 
purpose shown to have been the case here,  the proscriptions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with by the lessee .  .   .  .» 
That Burton might not stand alone as precedent for application 
of the "totality of government involvement" test is suggested by the 
decision in the Eaton case which was brought up again after the Si "Una 
decision.    The court did not refer to Burton alone but said, "Because 
of the Burton and Simkins decisions  ...  a new and independent exam- 
ination must be made  of the relationship between the governmental 
bodies and the James Walker Memorial Hospital."52    Two judges  (Haynsworth 
and Boreman),  who had dissented in Simkins,  concurred only on the basis 
of Simkins which they considered binding even though they were still 
unpersuaded of the  correctness of that decision.    And in a later decision, 
this phenomenon was  called the "Burton-Simkins analysis.»" 
Despite the resulting confusion as to its meaning,  the Burton case 
can clearly be placed in the leasing category.   Whether it suggested a 
new theory of state  action is relatively unimportant because the fact 
that there was a government lease involved prevented a clear application 
52Eaton v. Grubbs and Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial 
Hospital, 329 F. 2d 710 (Uth Cir. 15*>1»;. 
53snith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses,  360 F. 2d 577 
(Uth Cir .1258). 
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of the "totality of government involvement" test.    There was one con- 
nection between the Eagle Coffee Shoppe and government which was of 
itself sufficient to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment—the lease.    In 
Simkins,  on the other hand, no connection between the hospitals and 
government was in itself sufficient for a finding of state action, yet 
the total of these contacts was held to fulfill the requirement.^ 
In Simkins, for the first time,  the ttotality of government involvement" 
test was clearly applied,  and a new concept of state action was written 
into  constitutional law. 
There are a number of problems inherent in this new view of state 
action.    Exactly how much involvement with government is necessary to 
render an otherwise private institution's actions subject to the Four- 
teenth Amendment prohibitions?    Would any smaller combination of contacts 
in Simkins have been sufficient?    Precisely what does it take to satisfy 
the state action requirement under this new test? 
51»As noted earlier,  Sobeloff attached significance to four factors 
in the Simkins case*    the provision of the Hill-Burton Act that the United 
States could recover part of its grant to a hospital should that hospital 
cease to be nonprofit or be sold to anyone not approved by the Hill- 
Burton state agency; the Act's requirement that the state set minimum 
standards for maintenance and operation of hospitals receiving Hill- 
Burton aid and North Carolina's licensing law in fulfillment of that 
requirement; federal standards for the number of facilities required to 
provide adequate  service and the manner in which a state agency was 
to determine the priority of projects; and the requirement  of a state 
plan which met the requirements as to lack of discrimination on account 
of race and for furnishing hospital services to the indigent.    Each of 
these factors alone would not have been sufficient to find state action 
under the control test, affection with a public interest test,  or the 
essential function of the state test. 
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The majority in Simkins agreed that "Not every subvention by 
the federal or state government automatically involves the beneficiary 
in  'state action,1.  .   .* but when either government gives financial 
assistance it is usually significantly involved with the recipient in 
order to insure proper expenditure of the funds.    Might not this legal 
rule embrace, as well as Hill-Burton hospitals, as attorneys for Cone 
and Long suggest,  "... the private denominational college with a 
grant in aid of research from such a Federal source as the Small Business 
Administration .   .   . and by inevitable extension,  it would bar not  only 
discrimination by the college but also its chapel services."55   Also, 
as a result of the legal rules established in Engel v. Vitale,56 School 
District of Abington v. Schempp,57 and Simkins,  might not a parochial 
school which enters into an agreement with the state concerning the use 
of public school buses, driver education courses, or other public school 
benefits which private and religious schools lack, become sufficiently 
involved with government to render it an agent of the state,  like a 
public school, is which required prayers constitute a violation of the 
First Amendment?    Theoretically speaking,  if there is sufficient state 
action to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment,  is there not also enough to 
invoke the First?£8 
55Roth and Brooks,  "In the Supreme Courti    Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari," p. 9. 
^370 U. S. U21 (1962). 
57371* u. S. 203 (1963) 
&Tba First Amendment originally applied wflgto****** _g?" 
ment but since Cantwell v. Connecticut,  310 U. S. 296  (19U0), it has been 
held to apply to the state through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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How this new test for determining state action will be utilised, 
of course,   remains to be seen.    It is perhaps even less clear nhere 
the line between public and private action falls, but one thing is 
clear*    the category of actions that may be labeled "government" has 
been greatly enlarged by the theory of state action established in 
Sirakins. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE EOOCOn CASE AND NONDISCRETENATION 
The potential effect of Simkins on racial discrimination in 
medicine was staggering.    Overnight 6,000 hospitals found themselves 
legally transformed from private institutions to agents of the state 
for purposes  of the Fourteenth Amendment.    As had been speculated in 
the early stages of litigation* 
If the Justice Department prevails in this suit,  just 
imagine what  can happen!    Six thousand hospitals which 
in the past, whether or not they had "separate-but-equal* 
waivers,  have regarded themselves as private institutions 
and thus free to accept or bar whomever they wanted, will 
now .   .   .  find themselves on a very different footing.* 
Although today the value of Simkin3 as a weapon against racial 
segregation and discrimination in medical facilities has been largely 
overshadowed by the combined effects of Title VI of the 196U Civil Rights 
Act and the 1965 Medicare Act,  it is not to be discounted.    The decision 
in this  case was the first step taken in the desegregation of federally 
assisted medical facilities and it represented a turning point in the 
fight for nondiscrimination requirements in all government-assisted 
programs. 
Ijohn A. Kenney, "Medical Civil Rights," National Medical Association 
Journal, LV (September, 1963), U31. 
93 
Immediate Results of the Ruling 
Those who had fought for the desegregation of medical facilities 
were almost afraid to respond to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari 
with optimism.    The decision was obviously a step toward ending seg- 
regated medical facilities, but what practical effect would it have? 
Jack Greenberg said the decision would "... put an end to keeping 
Negroes out of white hospitals or segregating them within the hospitals  •   . 
and it would "...  be an entering wedge for Negro physicians into the 
mainstream of medical practice in the South.*'    He added, however, "We 
wait to  see whether the medical profession will voluntarily follow the 
law or whether a long,hard process of litigation such as we have had with 
the schools will be necessary."^    On March 3, 196U, Senator Javits called 
the  Supreme Court's action of the day before "a most welcome development,** 
but he,  too,  had reservationsx    "The other side of the coin remains un- 
clear.    This is the question of whether HEW will now deny further Federal 
tax money to  applicants for new or additional segregated hospitals."5 
Even before the two hospitals directly involved in the decision 
were affected, however,  the Public Health Service began to act.6    Imme- 
diately after the Circuit Court's decision in November,  1963,  it moved 
2New York Tines,  March 3, 196U,  p. 1. 
3lbid. 
%. S., Congressional Record,  88th Cong.,  2d Sess.,  196U, CX, 
Part 3, 14183. 
Slbid., U186. 
6The order enjoining Cone and long hospitals from discrimination on 
the basis of race was entered April 16, 1J6U, in the Court for the Middle 
District of North Carolina. 
9k 
1 
to suspend approval of all new applications for "separate but equal" 
facilities.'    On March 9, 1°6U,  a week after the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare, Anthony Celebrezze,  announced the new nondiscrimination 
requirements to implement the Simkins decision.    The  suspension of 
"separate but equal" applications was made permanent,  and assurances 
of nondiscrimination applying to admission of patients as well as staff 
privileges were to be required of future applicants.    Significantly, 
nondiscrimination in admission of patients meant that patients would 
have access to all portions of the facility.    Formerly,  hospitals of 
the "nondiscriminatory" variety could deny a Negro access to those 
sections of the facility which had not been constructed with federal 
funds.8 
Hill-Burton projects which had already been completed were un- 
affected by the new regulations but those still under construction were 
brought in line with the new policy.    Is a condition for continuing to 
receive aid,  assurances of nondiscrimination in admissions were required 
from the sponsors of eight "separate but equal" facilities which were 
unfinished at that time.9   In response to a request by the Public Health 
Service, the sponsors of almost 700 of the 835 "nondiscriminatory" 
facilities under construction gave assurance that staff privileges 
7u.  S. Commission on Civil Rights, Equal Opportunity in Hospitals 
and Health Facilities, p. 7. 
8lbid. 
9lbid., p. 8. 
would be available without discrimination on account of race .10 
Amending the Hill-Burton Act 
For several years prior to the Siskins case there had been a 
number of attempts in the Congress to delete the "separate but equal" 
provision of the Hi 11-Burton Act.    In September, 1961,  Senator Javits 
introduced such a bill, but it died in committee.11    Representative 
Diggs introduced a similar bill  (H. R. 1231°)  in the House in June of 
1962.u    Other efforts in February,  March,  and May of 1963 were also 
unsuccessful in eliminating discrimination in the Hill-Burton program. 3 
Another way to effect nondiscrimination in the Hill-Burton program 
was through an amendment to any appropriation bill for the program.    This, 
too, was    tried.    On March 27, 1962, Representative Ryan introduced an 
amendment to the appropriation bill for the departments of Labor and 
Health, Education and Welfare! 
Provided further,  that no amounts appropriated in this 
paragraph may be used for grants or loans for any hospital, 
facility or nursing home established,  or having separate 
facilities,  for population groups  .  .   .  .^ 
!Oibid.    As was discussed in Chapter I, nondiscriminatory facilities 
admitted Negro patients but were under no obligation to have a nondis- 
criminatory policy with respect to  staff privileges. 
llu. s„ Congressional Record,  87th Cong., 1st Sess.,  1961, CVTI, 
Part 16,  20973. 
12lbid., 88th Cong., 1st Sess., CTX, Part 2, 21*82. 
130n February 18, 1963, H. R. 38& to amend the Hill-Burton Act 
was introduced.    Ibid.,  88th Cong., 1st Sess., CIX, Part 2,  21*82.    There 
were two bills introduced for this purpose in March,  1963*    H. R. Wtf> 
on March k  (Ibid., Part 3, 3U28) and S. 1218 on March 28Jgi*" **f k> 
5021).    H. RT5330 was introduced May 1$,  1963.    Ibid., ParF7,  8623. 
%bid„  87th Cong.,  2d Sess., 1962, CVTH, Part h,  5l61u 
The House  rejected Iran's amendment, and in July, 1962, when the same 
appropriation bill was being considered in the Senate,  Javits proposed 
a similar amendment to end the  spending of federal funds for segregated 
hospitals.    Javits'  amendment also failed to become law.1^   Again,  in 
August of 1963,  Senator Javits attempted, unsuccessfully, to end dis- 
crimination in the Hill-Burton program by amending an appropriation 
bill.16 
In view of the recent history of attempts to change the "separate 
but equal"  policy of the  Hill-Burton program,  it was very significant 
that the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the Simkins case 
occurred when the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
was holding hearings on the Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendments 
of 1961; (H.  R. lOOUl).    The purpose of this bill was primarily to en- 
large  the Hill-Burton program,  but it also proposed to delete the "separate 
but equal"  provision of the law.    There was one last attempt to circumvent 
the effects  of the Siakins decision.    On March 12 ,  1S>6U, Dr. Francis 
Coleman,  representing the American Medical Association, appeared before 
the  committee and recommended the amendment,  "Nor shall the acceptance 
of funds by a private facility under this title be construed as making 
that facility a public institution."1?    Secretary Celebrezze,  however, 
IftEbid., Part 11, H»309. 
%bid., 88th Cong., 1st Sess., CIX, Part 11, liU*°U. 
^"Celebrezze Testimony on Non-discrimination Under Hill-Burton 
Law Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U. S. K0*** 
of ftspresentatives," National Medical Association Journal, LVI  (May, 19oiiJ, 
287. 
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emphasized in his testimony that "Any consideration of this question 
must be made  in light of the  recent decision ... in the case of 
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital."18    simkins, he  reminded 
the committee,  stated the public policy that was then guiding HEW, 
and he enumerated the steps that had been taken to implement that 
decision. 
Congress,   in the end,  partially followed the policy which had 
been pronounced in Simkins.    On August 18,  1°6U,  H. R. lOOUl became 
Public Law 88-lUt3»    The  "separate but equal" provision was deleted,  but 
section 603   (e) of that act provided that in order to receive Hill- 
Burton funds,  an applicant must give assurance that* 
(1) the facility or portion thereof to be constructed or 
modernized will be made available to all persons residing 
in the territorial area of the applicant*  .  .   .19 
Thus, Congress prohibited discrimination only in those portions of the 
facility which benefited from federal aid,  not the entire facility. 
Under the Simkin3  rule,  the entire hospital would be found subject to 
the Fourteenth Amendment and be required to be nondiscriminatory,  not 
just the part of the facility which was constructed or modernized with 
federal aid. 
Congress had not gone as far as the decision, and theoretically 
there could,  on the basis of the law alone,  still be discrimination ifl 
a Hill-Burton hospital which granted the assurances requested.    By August 
of 196U, however,  this made little difference because the 196U Civil 
Ifllbld.,  286. 
hospital and Medical Facilities Amendments of 196U,  in U. S., 
Statutes"at Large,  LXXVITI,  UU7. 
I 
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Rights Act had been passed in July.    Title VI of that act, which required 
that there be no discrimination on the basis of race  in federally assisted 
programs, had already eliminated the possibility of discrimination on 
the part of future recipients of Hill-Burton funds. 
The Civil Rights Act of 196Ui    Title VI 
The Simkins decision was also directly pertinent to other matters 
before the Congress in the spring of 1°6U»    "The decision could have 
some impact on the forthcoming civil rights debate in the Senate," the 
New York Times suggested.20   Arthur Krock,  in an editorial on March 5, 
however, was a little more positive about the impact of the decision* 
Timing was the nest significant feature of the Court's decision to deny 
certiorari, he claimedI 
In this instance it was known to all concerned—including 
the Court, which also reads the newspapers—that Senate 
opponents of this particular section (Title VT of the equal 
rights bill)  were preparing a last-ditch effort to legislate 
the exemptions which were outlawed in the lower court 
decision it allowed to stand.    This being so,  and in view 
of the additional fact that the Supreme Court can indef- 
initely postpone announcing whether it will review a 
lower court decision,  it must be concluded that the Court 
was fully aware its timing in the case would cut the 
ground away from the effort in the Senate to maintain in 
Title VI the exemption authorized in the Hill-Burton Act. 
Thus,  Krock felt that the  Simkins case would very definitely have an impact 
on the civil rights debate, for the effect of the Supreme Court's action 
20March 3, 196U, p. 1. 
21"A Court  Ruling Extended to Pending Legislation," New York Times, 
March 5, 196U,  p. 32. 
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was "... to validate,  as mandatory under the Constitution,  a hotly- 
disputed section of this legislation in advance of Congressional action."22 
Those who opposed Title VI of the Civil Rights Bill had a number 
of arguments.    Many of them felt that this title  created new and virtu- 
ally unlimited powers for the Administration.    Senator TaLmadge said, 
speaking of Title VII    "This proposal would authorize a Federal official 
to disregard the acts of Congress from the beginning of Congress to 
the present time,  and disregard, in totality appropriations, and say, 
•I am the law;  I am the  rule; you must do it my way.'"23    Other opponents 
of Title VI argued that Congress had always frowned upon blanket amend- 
ments to existing statutes, yet this title would amend almost every 
federal law appropriating funds for programs.2tt    Senator Eastland sub- 
mitted a list of over 100 programs which would be affected by the title 
support of this proposition.2^    And Senator Stennis also objected to in si 
26 the changing of so many programs with "one stroke  of the pen.* 
To counter these arguments, proponents of Title VI relied heavily 
on the  Simkins decision.    Javits answered his opponents,  "... Title VI 
does not create any new legal or administrative powers.    The spending of 
Federal tax revenues  ... for segregated programs is not only morally 
22ibid. 
23u. S., Congressional Record,  88th Cong.,  2d Sess., 196U, C3C, 
Part U, 5253. 
2%bid., 5087. 
25ibid., Part 5, 5871. 
26ibid., 5793. 
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wrong but a clear violation of the fifth amendment,  as the Federal 
Courts have recently held in the case of the Hill-Burton Hospital 
Construction Act."^'    Senator Kuchel argued, "In my judgment,  the 
President has clear authority now under the Constitution to eliminate 
discrimination in federally assisted programs.    Those statutes which 
did sanction  'separate but equal1 hospitals,  schools and colleges are 
patently unconstitutional and in the case of hospitals this has re- 
cently been affirmed by the Supreme Court.*2o 
Other members of the opposition took the position that since the 
Administration already had the power to require nondiscrimination in 
federal programs,  Title VT was unnecessary. "    Senator Pastore thought 
the Sinik-iriH decision dictated otherwise, however: 
The Supreme Court declined to review that decision; so 
it is the law of our land. Yet despite the effort of the 
court of appeals to strike down discrimination in the 
Simkins case, the same court was forced last week to rule 
again in a Wilmington, N. C. suit that a private hospital 
operated with public funds must desist from barring Negro 
physicians from staff merabership.30 
Title VT was very necessary, he thought, because there were "... several 
instances,  such as the Simkins case in Greensboro,  N. C. where suit was 
27ibid., Part 6,  7102. 
28Ibid., Part 5, 6561. 
2SWs was Senator Byrd's view.    He cited the Simkins decision and 
Executive Order No. mill, which required that there be no racial dis- 
crimination in federally assisted construction contracts.    Ibid., Part o, 
801*7. 
30lbid., 7051*. 
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instituted because  certain hospitals would not admit Negro patients. 
It is necessary to litigate again, again, and again because the Supreme 
Court can only strike down segregation in the particular case before 
it."'1    Also,  it was pointed out that without Title VI there would 
still be discrimination in many government programs because of differences 
in existing statutes,  especially under those laws which contained 
"separate but equal" provisions,  such as the Morrill Act of 1890  (Land 
Grant College Act)  and the School Construction Act of 19$0.32    in 
reference to these acts Senator Humphrey said,  "It may be that all of 
these statutory provisions are unconstitutional and separable as the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recently held in a case 
under the Hill-Burton Act.  .  .  .    But it is certainly desirable to wipe 
them off the books without waiting for further judicial action."33 
It is quite clear from the debates in the  Senate that the Simkins 
decision had  cut the ground from under the arguments of opponents of 
Title VI.    The ruling had presented the Congress with a fait accompli* 
It  is conceivable that Title VT night not have  become law without the 
support given its proponents by the Simkins decision.    It is more  probable, 
however,  that a Congress which,  as recently as August,  1963, had refused 
to eliminate discrimination in the Hill-Burton program, might have passed 
a considerably weaker ban on discrimination in government-assisted pro- 
Court's action.    Surely knowledge grams had it not been for Supreme 
3llbid., 8057. 
32ibid., part 5, 6c£0. 
33ibid., 65U*. 
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that any exemptions written into the title might be subsequently de- 
clared unconstitutional on the basis of Sijnkins discouraged,  if it did 
not preclude, efforts to legislate exceptions to the title.    Moreover, 
the Simkins case enabled many to agree with Senator Pastore when he 
confidently said,  "Title VI is sound;  it is morally right; it is legally 
right; it is  constitutionally right.»3i» 
The Courts 
Title VI regulations did not reach health facilities which had 
been completed and those which no longer received federal financial aid 
after January U, 196$.    In the absence of voluntary racial integration, 
the medical facilities which had received government aid prior to 1965 
could be desegregated by court action applying the Simkins ruling. 
A few medical facilities' discriminatory practices have been 
halted by the legal remedy afforded Negroes by Simkins.    The  case of 
Eaton v.  James Walker Memorial Hospital (which the defendants in Simkins 
had urged was controlling in their case)  came before the courts again. 
The court held that because of Burton and Simkins a new examination 
had to be made of the facts in Baton.35    The court ruled that the 
Simkins case was controlling,  thus the Walker Hospital was found subject 
to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.    In February of 1965, 
a federal district  court in South Carolina applied the Simkins ruling 
to a case involving discrimination in Orangeburg Regional Hospital.3© 
31ilbid., Part 6,  705U. 
^Eaton v. Grubbs and Board of Managers of James Walker Manorial 
Hospital,  3§9 F. 2d 710  (l|th Cir. 1904J. 
^Rackley v. Board of Trustees of Orangeburg Regional Hospital, 
238 F.  Supp. 512   (E.D.S.C. 1%!?). 
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In 1966,  another case,  Smith T. Hampton Training School for Nurses,37 
was decided on the basis of Sinking.    Thus, the case itself set a 
precedent which proved useful in eliminating racial discrimination 
in medical facilities. 
Litigation on the basis of Slinking might be necessary even today 
had Congress not enacted the Medicare Act in the summer of 1965.    In 
order to receive funds under Medicare, a hospital was required to comply 
with the provisions of Title VT of the Civil Rights Act of 196U.    If 
a hospital failed to comply, it could not receive Medicare patients and 
would not be able to apply for grants under other federal programs. 
Since most hospitals could not afford to refuse Medicare patients, this 
law has in effect eliminated the use of Simkins for purposes of deseg- 
regation of medical  facilities. 
Although there is no longer much need to appeal to the Simkins 
decision in the area of medicine, the precedent set in the case might 
be of use for desegregation in other areas.    Although the court said 
"Not every subvention by the federal or state government automatically 
involves the beneficiaries in  'state action'   ..." a great deal of 
"involvement" between recipient and donor usually results from govern- 
ment aid.    Many institutions which had received government  (state or 
federal,  or both) aid before 1961* could be enjoined from discriminatory 
action on the basis of Simkins.    For example, suit could probably be 
brought successfully against businessmen or private  colleges which had 
received assistance from government prior to 1961* for racial discrimination. 
37360 F. 2d 577 (Uth Cir. 1966). 
ioU 
The  case of Simkins v. Cone Hospital has been most significant 
in eliminating discrimination on account of race in medical facilities 
throughout the United States.    It has not only afforded a legal remedy 
for the desegregation of 6,000 hospitals through court action, but 
it also induced the Congress to amend the Hill-Burton Act to end future 
discrimination in that program.    Its significance,  however,  goes beyond 
medicine to  reach virtually all government-assisted programs.    The 
principle established in Simkins is applicable to other controversies 
which might arise concerning racial discrimination by private institutions 
which have at one time received government aid.    Finally,  although the 
degree of importance is difficult to determine,  Simkins certainly played 
a significant role in the passage of the 1961» Civil Rights let's Title VI, 
which ended legal discrimination in federally assisted programs after 
January, 1965• 
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CONCLUSION 
Before the decision of G. C. SimkLns et al. T. Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hospital et al., discrimination against Negro doctors and 
patients was practiced throughout the entire United States.    A variety 
of discriminatory methods were employed by medical facilities,  and 
a national law,  the Hill-Burton Act,  provided for the appropriation 
of funds to build "separate but equal" hospitals.    Under this statute 
even hospitals receiving aid on a "nondiscriminatory* basis could 
refuse Negroes access to portions of the facility not built with fed- 
eral funds and refuse staff privileges to qualified persons on the 
basis  of race.    By 1963, over 6,000 hospitals in the United States 
had received Hill-Burton aid and regarded themselves as private insti- 
tutions.    The Simkins decision ended that illusion. 
While Simkins was still in the process of appeal,  Constance B. 
Motley wrote, *A victory in this case would be as significant,  in my 
judgment, as the school desegregation decision because of the tremendous 
number of hospitals in this country receiving such federal assistance.■» 
Aside from the sheer number of hospitals which could be desegregated 
by court action on the basis of Simkins, however, the case had signif- 
icance  for integration in other ways.    The Department of Health, Ed- 
ucation and Welfare acted to prevent future discrimination in the 
^-^Desegregation, What it Means to the Medical Profession and the 
Responsibilities it Places on the Negro Professional,» National Medical 
Association Journal, LV (September, 1963),  1^2. 
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Hill-Burton program by changing the  regulations of the program to comply 
with Simkins,  and the Congress finally amended the Hill-Burton Act to 
end the financing of "separate but equal" facilities,  something it had 
refused to do as recently as August,  1963.    The Supreme Court's denial 
of certiorari occurred at the time the Senate was  considering the 196h 
Civil Rights Bill,  and although the case may not have been the only 
factor insuring passage of Title VI,  it certainly destroyed the possi- 
bility that  certain exceptions to that title would be written into the 
law.    As a result of Title VI, virtually all programs receiving federal 
assistance after January,  1965,  were required to be free of racial 
discrimination.2    Simkins took the first stept    Congress followed. 
The  importance of Simkins does not end with desegregation of 
medical facilities or other institutions which have received government 
aid.    This decision wrote into constitutional law a new concept, a new 
theory of state action.    Since I883, the judiciary has been bound by 
the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to private 
actions  but to those of the state.    While continually expanding the 
definition of state action,  the courts sedulously denied departing fron 
the rule established in the I883 Civil Rights Cases.    Through long years 
of litigation,  state action gradually evolved to include such things as 
the actions of private lessees of public property,  private organizations 
performing a function of the state,  and private institutions under the 
control of the  state.    With the new test developed in Simkins,  practically 
2This is not to say that there  is no longer any racial discrimi- 
nation in federally assisted programs,  or even to say that there is no 
longer any discrimination in medical facilities.    The discrimination that 
does exist, however,  is not legal as it had been in many cases prior to 
Simkins,  the 1961; Civil Rights Act, and Medicare. 
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any private institution may be brought within the Constitution's reach. 
Hardly any institution, or person, for that matter,  is free of involve- 
ment with government.    Exactly how many government involvements and 
how much weight each should contribute to reach a significant total on 
the state action scales is not  clear.    The court presented in Simkins 
a new test for finding state action,  but it neglected to state what 
it takes to satisfy the  requirements of that test.    In Simkins the 
court took another step away from the 1883 Civil Rights Cases without 
overruling the precedent established in that decision.    Perhaps the 
Civil Rights Cases have been overruled—for if the line between state 
and private action has not been erased,  it has certainly been shifted 
to include a great number of formerly private institutions within the 
definition of state action. 
Judged both on the basis of its effect on racial discrimination 
and its effect on constitutional law,  Simkins v. Cone Hospital has earned 
the designation,  "landmark decision." 
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